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This thesis evaluates Japanese geopolitical change in the post-Cold War 
era.  It does so by analyzing Japan’s history, its foreign policy since 1945, its 
reasons for becoming a normal country, and the impact of its normalization.  This 
thesis makes three arguments.  First, Japan, although its history is replete with 
internal rivalry and conflict, never displayed an aggressive foreign policy with 
expansionist and adventurist characteristics—with the exception of an 
insignificant expedition to Korea in the 1590s—before the Meiji Restoration.  
Second, Japan should become a normal country because it would advance 
Japan’s regional leadership, increase the likelihood of Japan’s accession to the 
United Nations Security Council as a permanent member, and improve its 
economy in both the short and the long run.  Finally, no significant barrier stands 
against Japanese normalization; however, Japan must follow cautious and 
amicable relations with China and the two Koreas in order to achieve normalcy.  
In conclusion, the thesis makes policy recommendations for Japan and the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. SITUATION 
1. Cold War Context 
Japan’s politics, foreign relations, and economy stabilized after the 
conclusion of the peace treaty in 1951.  Domestically, the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP), a largely conservative institution, which established close links with 
the bureaucracy on the one hand, and the business interests, on the other, 
controlled the government.  Under this regime, the Japanese economy 
flourished.  Externally, the consequence was a close link with the United States.  
The U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, negotiated at the same time as the 
peace treaty, gave Japan the protection of a nuclear umbrella in a divided world.  
The partnership also provided Japan in its early years with access to American 
capital and technology.  Although the relationship was not always smooth, its 
continuation was naturally presumed by both parties for more than two decades.1   
2. Post-Cold War Japan 
The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War raised 
many questions in Japan about the assumptions that the American alliance was 
instituted upon.  In addition to such questions, Japan’s boom years suddenly 
ended, plunging the country into its most painful recession since the aftermath of 
the Second World War.  It also threatened the political settlement of 1955, under 
which the LDP has assured its power in governance.2
3. The Question of Normal Japan 
Although it has been around since the 1960s in different forms, the 
question of “normal Japan” reached high levels in the post-Cold War era, 
especially after 1993, when Ichiro Ozawa stated it outspokenly.  The United 
States and the rest of the western world have been urging Japan to share the 
 
1 W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change since 
1850, revised ed., (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 278. 
2 Ibid, 279. 
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burden of global security because Japan stands tall as one of the few economic 
superpowers in the world.  In this context, how to strengthen the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces and participate in foreign peacekeeping missions have become 
significant policy debates in Japan.  Along the same lines, revision of the 
Japanese constitution, particularly to change the war-renouncing Article 9, has 
become a topic of heated discussion in Japan. 
With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, the Cold War came to a screeching and unexpected halt.  In the following 
years, Japan faced significant economic and political problems, which made the 
1990s a “lost decade” in Japan.  The economic recession that Japan slithered 
into in the early 1990s continues to inflict economic pain in Japan even today.  In 
1993, the end of the miracle economy and other reasons led to the Liberal 
Democratic Party’s (LDP) losing that year’s election, ending a 38-year reign over 
Japan.3  This compelled the LDP to join in a coalition government, which for a 
while was headed by a socialist prime minister, Murayama Tomiichi.  By 1996, 
the LDP was returned to power as a majority party under the leadership of 
Hashimoto Ryutaro.  The party was practically unopposed until 1998, when the 
opposition Democratic Party of Japan was formed.4  Since then, the opposition 
has been gaining momentum.  Today, the government is led by Prime Minster 
Koizumi Junichiro, holding office since 2001, who is a member of the Liberal 
Democratic Party.5  He made a radical change toward normalcy which allowed 
for members of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to be sent to Iraq. 
Today, the ruling coalition is formed by the conservative LDP and also the 
New Clean Government Party (Shin Komeito).6  The significance of these 
 
3 “A History of the Liberal Democratic Party,” in Liberal Democratic Party of Japan Official 




6 “List of Koizumi Cabinet members,” in Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/cabinet_e.html, accessed on 1 November 2005. 
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political events influences Japanese normalization.  Japan with its location, 
economic power, and military strength shall remain at the center of this 
assessment of Japanese normalcy; however, because Japan is seriously 
concerned that most of its neighbors discourage Japan from becoming a normal 
world political power, this issue also shall be assessed. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze Japanese geopolitical change in 
the post-Cold War era.  When Japan lost the war in 1945, it surrendered 
unconditionally to the United States.  Thus, a new constitution was put in place 
with Article 9 roughly stating that Japan could not have any military of significant 
size other than a small, administrative structure.  The defense and security of 
Japan have been substantially provided by the United States since then.  Japan 
went through a serious rebuilding process after World War II.  The United States 
was the major benefactor in rebuilding Japan through the 1950s and the 1960s.  
In the 1970s, Japan emerged as a new economic giant, and in the 1980s, Japan 
was one of the four richest countries in the world.  Japan since World War II has 
gone through so many serious political and social changes that almost all nations 
in the world, including the United States, are certain that the chance of Japan 
going back to fascism is virtually nonexistent.  With all these facts at hand and 
with the end of the Cold War, the security of Japan has taken a different outlook.  
Recently, the issue of Japanese strengthening the Self-Defense Force and 
rearmament has come up, and the United States has encouraged Japan to 
become its own provider of security.  By strengthening its military forces, Japan 
could become a “normal” country again.  This thesis will seek to answer whether 
or not Japan should become a normal country. 
C. IMPORTANCE 
Japan is one of the great economic leaders in the world.  It is the most 
important ally of the United States in East Asia.  As a result of its constitution, 
Japan’s defense and security was substantially provided by the United Sates, so 
Japan never had to build a large enough military to provide entirely for its own 
defense.  Since the end of the Cold War, potential rearmament of Japan has 
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become an important issue.  The cost of providing Japanese defense is large, 
and the United States is willing to turn over more of the burden for defense of 
Japan to the Japanese.   
Increasingly, Japan is willing to assume a more active part in the security 
issues of the world.  With limited serious military power, however, Japan cannot 
take a regional lead with global significance and cannot become a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council.  If Japan wants to take an active 
part in the stabilization of its region and emerge as a democratic leader in Asia 
without depending on the American security umbrella, then the Japanese 
decision makers have to take serious steps in rearmament.  These steps could 
benefit Japan not only in political terms, but also in economic terms in the long 
run, yet it could also trigger major changes in regional security dynamics.  This 
thesis will analyze the political and strategic changes in post-Cold War Japan so 
far and the likely consequences of a constitutional change (Article IX).  It will 
provide an analysis of Japanese foreign policy goals and the Japanese view of 
America and its foreign policy.  Using the tools provided by realist, liberal, and 
domestic politics traditions, this thesis will also draw on international relations 
theory to assess the consequences of Japanese rearmament and the 
strengthening of military forces.  
D. MAJOR QUESTIONS 
This thesis aims to answer three major questions.  First, what is the 
historical context of Japanese normalization?  Second, should Japan become a 
normal country or should it avoid that option?  Third, what are the likely impacts 
and consequences of Japanese normalization?  This question further analyzes 
the international consequences of Japanese normalization to include its impact 
on regional stability and prosperity and its effects on US-Japan relations. 
E. MAJOR ARGUMENTS 
This thesis argues that Japan will benefit from becoming a normal nation 
in four different ways.  It will help stabilize its region, it will improve its economic 
well-being in the long run, it will become fully independent, and it will provide its 
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own security, which will give more flexibility to its foreign policy.  By doing so, 
Japan will also become a potential regional center of power and will drastically 
increase its chances of becoming a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council.  The thesis also makes use of the main international relations 
theories in an attempt to show why Japan should normalize.  Japanese 
normalization will benefit Japan’s regional leadership with global economic 
significance, permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and economic 
benefits that in the short and long run all depend on Japan’s ability to assert itself 
more proactively in East Asia.   
F. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This is a policy analysis research project.  The methodology used in this 
thesis is an analysis of possible outcomes using current and past trends 
regarding the revision of the Japanese constitution and therefore expansion of 
the allowed and accepted role and capacity of Japan’s defense structure as well 
as its use of military power.  The research heavily depends on historical patterns 
in the development of Japanese foreign policy. 
Sources include official documents and publications by the Japanese 
government, statements by Japanese officials, and agreements between the 
United States and Japan.  News releases, past and present, supplemented by 
the secondary writings of academic specialists are analyzed as this is an ongoing 
issue. 
Using a combination of primary and secondary sources, this thesis 
describes the problems facing modern day Japan, specifically about 
normalization.  It uses historical data to outline how the situation has developed 
into what it is today.  In addition, it makes use of a combination of primary and 
secondary sources to discuss the relationship between the United States and 
Japan, looking back on the previous relations of the two nations.  In the end, this 
thesis aims to explain Japanese normalization and makes a policy 




The research will first situate Japan in historical context and will analyze 
the details of the recent events that not only took place in Japan, but also around 
the globe in general.  It then will assess Japanese normalization, which will be 
followed by an analysis of the impacts of Japanese normalization.  The thesis will 
conclude with policy recommendations for both Japan and the United States.      
Chapter II provides a brief historical background on Japan including its 
early history through the Cold War.   
Chapter III describes Japan’s foreign policy outlook during the post-Cold 
War era and analyzes Japanese politics in the context of normalization.   
Chapter IV explains the reasons for Japanese normalization.  These 
reasons are the stability of the region, long-term economic benefits, full 
independence with the prospects of becoming a permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council, and independence in defense decision-making 
with a larger area of flexibility in politics and strategy.  This chapter also assesses 
how Japan could implement a policy to become a normal country.   
Chapter V analyzes the impacts of a normal Japan on world affairs at 
large.  This chapter reviews the economic, military-political, and diplomatic 
impacts of Japanese normalization.  The regional impacts and the global 
significance of Japanese normalization are discussed in this chapter.   
Chapter VI will conclude with a summary of findings and assessments as 
well as providing a summary judgment on Japanese normalization.  It will also 
make policy recommendations for Japan in regards to normalization.  In addition, 
it will state the consequences of a normal Japan, and will also make policy 





                                           
II.  MODERN JAPAN: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is not only to assess Japanese history in order 
to present a chronological perspective of Japan in general, but also to reveal that 
Japanese history, although replete with internal rivalry and conflict, never 
displayed an aggressive foreign policy with expansionist and adventurist 
characteristics—with the exception of an insignificant expedition to Korea in the 
1590s—before the Meiji Restoration.  Japan, a transliterationist7 imitator of the 
Western world aiming to raise itself to an equal footing with the rest of the 
imperialist, expansionist, and opportunist great powers in the then-international 
balance of power system followed a flawed path of modernization, which in turn 
brought its demise at the end of the Second World War.  The imperialist balance 
of world power was in substantial decay following the Great Depression.  This 
decay also brought the entire balancing powers of Europe to their knees, and 
some fell flat on their faces, countries that included Germany and France.  
Japanese aggression in the 1930s and the first part of the 1940s and its demise 
at the end of the Second World War were no different from the fate of the many 
European powers of that time.  What made Japan significantly successful and 
prominent, however, was its reversion back to non-aggressive and knowledge-
and-advancement-seeking internal and external policies in the postwar years.  
The lessons Japanese learned as a result of the aggressive 1930s and the 
warring 1940s have been so well engrained in their culture and so well instilled in 
their minds that the world should not expect harm but expect to benefit greatly 
from a normal, assertive, and objective Japan mobilizing its latent economic 
 
7 The expression “transliterationist” is used in particular to demonstrate that Japan, 
historically, has Japanized the outside influence and foreign encroachment on itself.  The 
distinction between translation and transliteration differentiates the Japanese way of being 
influenced by outsiders.  In this context, I describe those who simply imitate others as 
“translationists” and who make use of outside influence by incorporating it into its own cultural, 
social, political, and economic practices as “transliterationists.”  Japanese fit into the second 
category.  For a larger definition, see Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea 1868-1910: 
A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1960), 1-18 and 514-539.  
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power to help the stabilizing powers of the world to further advance stability, 
peace, and world harmony.  In turn, this will help increase the welfare of not only 
the Japanese but also the citizens of the rest of the world.  This chapter and the 
following chapter will present a picture of the externally peaceful Japan while 
carefully noting the exception of the anomalous years following the enthronement 
of Emperor Meiji and ending with the Japanese defeat at the end of the Second 
World War.      
A. GENERAL 
1. Geography and People 
Few countries around the world have the allure of Japan.  Lush, green 
hillsides, meticulous farming, creative gardens, and chivalrous people combine to 
create a pleasant landscape.8  Called Nihon or Nippon Koku (Land of the Rising 
Sun) in Japanese and with a total size of 377,835 square kilometers, Japan is an 
archipelago of mountainous islands with numerous dormant and active 
volcanoes and is generally rainy with high levels of humidity.9  It consists of four 
large islands—Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku—and about 3,409 
smaller islands, which only constitute three percent of the Japanese land.10  In 
the north, Japan is bounded by the Sea of Okhotsk, where the narrow La 
Perouse Strait separates it from the southern tip of the Soviet island, Sakhalin.  
The Sea of Japan is on the west, and the Korea Strait lies between South Korea 
and Japan.  To the south extends the East China Sea, and to the east the Pacific 
Ocean.  Over two thirds of Japan’s land area is mountainous with a scarcity of 
lowlands, which represent only about 29 percent of the entire area.11  In these 
relatively small areas live the people of the eleventh most populous country in the 
 
8 George B. Cressey, Asia’s Lands and Peoples, 3rd Ed., (New York, London, Toronto: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), 198. 
9 Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden eds., Japan: A Country Study, 5  Edth ., (Washington, 
D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1992).  Also 
available on-line.  “Japan: A Country Study,” The Library of Congress, Country Studies, On-line 
book, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/jptoc.html, accessed on 5 June 2005. 
10 Cressey, 209. 
11 Robert H. Taylor, ed., Handbooks to the Modern World: Asia and the Pacific, (New York 
and Oxford: Facts on File, 1991), 125. 
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world12 and rests the world’s most sophisticated electronics industry.13  Nearly 
forty-five percent of the population is concentrated in the three metropolitan 
areas of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya.14
2. Recent Transformation 
Japan is governed under the constitution of 1947, the emperor is the head 
and the symbol of state with no governing powers, and the chief executive is the 
prime minister selected from the Diet—a bicameral legislative body, which 
consists of a House of Councilors (upper house) and a House of Representatives 
(lower house).15  Japan is divided into forty-seven administrative divisions, each 
headed by a popularly elected governor.16  Although significant in its own way, 
Japanese history before the Tokugawa era does not appear critically important 
for this study, and thus it is examined very minimally. Throughout this time, there 
were numerous feudal battles as various factions within the country vied for 
power.  With the Meiji Restoration, however, Japan changed drastically.   
Japan entered into the modern era in 1868 when its strongest “han”s 
(feudal fiefdoms) wanted to create a national government.  Young members of 
the military oligarchy dismantled the shogunate system, installed Emperor Meiji 
on the throne, and launched a vast program of industrialization and 
modernization.17  In order to accomplish their goals, they made use of two 
unique characteristics of Japan: the emperor and the Shinto culture.  These two 
characteristics helped Japanese leaders create a national identity which led to a 
significant modernization effort and produced a Western-type, strong nation while 
 
12 “Rank Order-Population,” The World Factbook, CIA, available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html, accessed on 15 October 
2005.  Note: On this webpage, Japan is rank ordered twelfth including the European Union (EU) 
in the list.  This thesis does not recognize the EU as a country in the traditional sense.   
13 Taylor, 126. 
14 Dolan and Worden, “Japan: A Country Study,” On-line book. 
15 “Japan,” The World Factbook, CIA, available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ja.html, accessed on 15 October 2005.   
16 Ibid. 
17 Taylor, 129. 
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the rest of Asia was suffering from imperialist encroachment and a lack of 
modernity.  This so-called Meiji Restoration transformed Japan from a feudal 
state into a major modern power.  The rest of this section will cover Japanese 
history before the end of the Cold War in an effort to set the stage for and explain 
the initiation of the normalization debate. 
B. ANCIENT JAPAN: ORIGINS AND ASUKA, NARA, AND HEIAN 
PERIODS 
Japanese culture emerged on Yamato plain around the 2nd and 3rd 
centuries A.D. and continued to gradually expand to the entire archipelago.  In 
this period, the Japanese created a centralized state reinforced by the adoption 
of a Chinese style political organization.  In this context, a cultural and social 
transformation, as well as the introduction of new features including foreign 
borrowing, the adoption of Buddhism, and the practice of writing took place.  The 
metamorphosis occurred under conditions that suited Japanese preferences and 
realities.  Among the lasting features that appeared in this era were Japan’s 
imperial lineage, the Shinto tradition, adoption of a Chinese-style state apparatus 
with Confucian ideological foundations, the consolidation of aristocratic politics, 
and the emergence of full-blown feudalism that created the stage for military 
governments under shoguns.18
1. Origins 
Three categories of evidence—mythical, historical records of foreign 
observers, and modern archaeology—paints a picture of the origins and the rise 
of Japanese civilization.  Evidence indicates that human presence in Japan dates 
back to the Stone Age, but Jomon culture dates back to 8-10,000 BCE.  During 
the Jomon Period, the inhabitants of the Japanese islands were gatherers, 
fishers and hunters.  Jomon is the name of the era's pottery.  Following this 
period was the Yayoi culture with distinctive Bronze Age characteristics.  The 
 
18John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and 
Transformation, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 324-357. 
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Yamato state emerged with the unique characteristic of a full-blown 
confederation of tribal states (kuni).19
2. Early Japanese State 
The rulers of Yamato established an overarching monarchical lineage by 
the 5th-6th centuries linking other clans (uji) through alliances of various sorts.20  It 
is during this time that the imperial lineage and the Shinto tradition start to 
emerge.  Records show that in 646 A.D., leaders of the Yamato family 
purportedly issued the Taika Reform Edict and eventually established their 
authority as a hereditary line of Heavenly Sovereigns.21  Thereafter, Japanese 
history is periodized according to the location of the imperial capital or the 
shogunate’s capital.  During the Asuka period, the Japanese capital rotated 
among settlements in this region until the capital was established in Nara, which 
started the 75-year long Nara period in 710 CE.  In 712, historians of the Yamato 
family finished compiling the Kojiki, the record of ancient matters.22  Immediately 
following this era was the Heian period during which the imperial court moved to 
a new, permanent capital at Heian, now called Kyoto.23  The latter part of the 
Heian period is often referred to as the Fujiwara period after the lineage of court 
aristocrats who dominated the imperial court from 858 to 1160.24  In short, 
throughout this period, a Japanese imperial system with Shinto and Buddhist 
authority was established, a system of domination of the imperial system by 
aristocratic clans emerged, major cultural strands were consolidated, and the 




19 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 325-329. 
20 Ibid, 330-334. 
21 James McClain, Japan: A Modern History, (New York and London: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2002), 2. 
22 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 329. 
23 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 337. 
24 Ibid, 351. 
25 McClain, 11-15. 
  12
                                           
C. FEUDAL JAPAN 
1. Origins of Feudalism 
For all its cultural brilliance, the Fujiwara court was not the direct ancestor 
of later Japanese society.26  It had grown too weak to survive as the dominant 
culture.  It served as a transmitter of its unique culture to another more vigorous 
group—the provincial warrior class.  The provincial aristocracy that emerged 
during this period is referred to as the bushi or samurai class of warriors.  It is 
important to note that feudalism in Japan seems to have resulted from 
administrative and legal institutions surviving from a centralized state—derived 
from a Chinese type of organization of the Nara period—and a system of 
personal bonds of loyalty, an earlier familial pattern of uji society.27
2. Feudal Regimes   
Three regimes—Taira, Kamakura, and Ashikaga—emerged during the 
subsequent period, none of which were thoroughly centralized.  After fierce 
fighting, in 1160, Taira Kiyomori prevailed for the next 30 years.28  Following four 
centuries of a rather traditional period, in 1192, Minamoto Yoritomo was 
appointed the seii tai shogun (Great Barbarian-Quelling General).29  He 
established his “tent government” at Kamakura, which was the strongest among 
the three aforementioned regimes, but was only effective for about 60 years from 
1220s until the Mongol invasions and their aftermath.30  Japan faced two 
invasion attempts by the armies of Kublai Khan, the Mongol Emperor and the 
grandson of Genghis Khan, in 1274 and 1281, both of which were obstructed by 
the typhoon gales known as kamikaze—divine winds—which ravaged the 
Mongol fleets and saved Japan from invasion.31  In 1333, Ashikaga Takauji 
 
26 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 358. 
27 Ibid, 358-361. 
28 McClain, 16. 
29 McClain, 16. 
30 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 363. 
31 McClain, 17. 
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overthrew the Minamato shogunate and became the shogun.32  Over time, local 
authorities evolved into autonomous regional units by the late 15th and 16th 
centuries called the han, which were presided over by aristocratic lords called the 
daimyo.  These leaders presided over the associated warriors—the samurai—
and administered the populace and resources of their domains.  Warfare among 
these domains was incessant.  After the Onin War among the military leaders in 
Kyoto during 1467-1477, warfare in the competing daimyo resulted in a century 
of perpetual conflict, named by the Japanese the “warring states” (sengoku) 
period.  In this period, effective overarching governance by the Ashikaga 
shoguns was completely absent.33
3. Initial Contact with Europeans 
In 1543, the first Portuguese traders landed on the island of Tanegashima, 
south of Kyushu, and only six years later did Francis Xavier inaugurate the first 
Christian Mission to Japan.  In 1571, the daimyo Omura Sumitada opened 
Nagasaki to Portuguese shipping.34   
D. TOKUGAWA JAPAN 
1. Establishing the Tokugawa Regime 
The Tokugawa military regime arose from this context.  The peculiar 
political order of Tokugawa Japan was the product of a long evolution, which 
reflected four characteristics.  First, centralized political authority using Chinese 
institutions failed and the power of local and regional military aristocratic elites 
grew steadily.  Second, as the imperial power withered, local politics was 
militarized, which created a segmented order presided over by a warrior caste.  
Third, decentralization of political and economic activity to regional and local 
levels created feudalism.  Finally, national unity emerged in the hands of a 
succession of military regimes that claimed to govern in the name of the 
emperor.  The founder of this order, Tokugawa Ieyasu, built his regime on the 
 
32 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 376. 
33 Ibid, 375-384. 
34 Ibid, 393-4. 
  14
                                           
efforts at unification of two military predecessors: Oda Nobunaga (1560s-1582) 
and Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1582-1598).  Tokugawa Ieyasu had been one of 
Hideyoshi’s principal generals.35
In 1573, the warlord Oda Nobunaga drove the Ashikaga shogun to exile, 
burned almost the entire city of Kyoto,36 and won a decisive victory at the Battle 
of Nagashino in 1575 after using Western style firearms in battle.37  In 1582, 
Nobunaga died,38 and was succeeded by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who hammered 
the daimyo into submission.39  After almost a decade later in 1590, Tokugawa 
Ieyasu transferred his domain to the Kanto region and began to construct the 
Edo Castle.40  Two years later, Hideyoshi initiated a major conquest campaign 
against Korea and his armies landed at Pusan.  He died in 1598, which resulted 
in Japanese armies’ retreat from Korean land.  In 1600, Tokugawa Ieyasu, after a 
two-year power struggle against a coalition of opponents, prevailed at the Battle 
of Sekigahara, and on the twelfth day of the second month in 1603, the Heavenly 
Sovereign recognized Tokugawa Ieyasu’s achievement by elevating him to the 
office of shogun,41 which marked the beginning of a two and a half centuries long 
period of isolation.42
2. Regime’s Source of Power 
Tokugawa Ieyasu’s regime unified Japan and established an order that 
provided a prolonged period of peace and political stability—lasting into the 19th 
 
35 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 392-434.  Also see McClain, 5-10 and 36-47.  
36 McClain, 18. 
37 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 396. 
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hands of another.  There is also disambiguation as to whether he died in 1581 or 1582, but most 
accounts cite 1582 as his year of death.  For more details, see McClain, 19. 
39 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 396. 
40 McClain, 20. 
41 Although the Heavenly Sovereign recognized Tokugawa Ieyasu as the shogun, this was 
only ceremonial.  In reality, the emperor was under the shogun’s control. 
42 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 397. 
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century—but it rested on the autonomous han administrations.  So long as the 
surviving daimyo (the chief of a han) did not challenge Tokugawa supremacy, the 
regime did not intrude on their authority in administering their han.  Thus, the 
Tokugawa regime was something less than a full-scale national government.  Its 
authority rested on its claim to speak for the emperor, whose court still resided in 
the traditional capital of Kyoto.  Its power rested on the superiority of its military 
forces, and behind that, its economic resources.  The Tokugawa regime 
sustained its power and maintained stability for such a long period because 
ultimately, it was a conservative, security-focused order preoccupied with 
security against subversion throughout its politics, institutions, and policies.  This 
was a natural result of the initial establishment of the regime by military means in 
a struggle for power among contending han.  It is important to note that to sustain 
their bakufu or tent government, a term used to describe the temporary location 
of the governing regime, the Tokugawa leaders focused on the prevention of 
overthrow by the same tactics that had brought them to power.  Also equally 
important is to note the Tokugawa’s legacy of economic, social, and intellectual 
trends in early modern Japan.43
3. Consequences 
The Tokugawa’s success created a long period of peace and stability, 
which in turn promoted dramatic economic development that built on trends 
emerging from the medieval period that preceded Japan’s modernization.  
Japan’s lightning modernization after 1868 was made possible because the 
Tokugawa order already created many essential elements of modernization.  
Therefore, the Tokugawa period is also referred to as Japan’s early modern 
period.  In this context, medieval economic trends flourished under regional 
specialization, monetization of the economy, expansion of a market system, and 
growth of cities mainly as the unanticipated economic consequences of 
conservative Confucian Tokugawa policies.  With the aforementioned economic 
change, there came inevitable social changes, which gave rise to merchants, a 
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vigorous urban culture, and partial decline of the warrior class.  The intellectual 
trends surfaced in three currents in this period: Confucianism, Dutch learning 
(rangaku), and national learning (kokugaku).  These trends had significant long-
term implications.  First, an awakening of interest in Shinto as Japan’s true, 
essential tradition became widespread.  Second, perceptions of the imperial line 
as the true center of Japan’s political life emerged.  Third, a proto-nationalistic 
sense of Japaneseness took root.44  For instance, by 1700, Edo became so large 
that it was said to be the largest city of its time in the world,45 and that Japanese 
development continued so swiftly that by 1839, at least 300 private academies 
were in operation in Japan.46  These trends laid the foundations for a sweeping 
change in the later 19th century. 
E. MEIJI RESTORATION  
1. Early Motives 
From the turn of the century, especially in the 1840s, the Western 
countries demanded more and more insistently that Japan end its isolation from 
the West47 and open up its markets to their goods.  In this context, Japan 
emerged from the long seclusion and began a program of integration into the 
system of nation-states created by the West.  Japan’s success at this was 
nothing short of spectacular.  By the end of the 19th century, Japan had 
undergone a revolutionary change of regime from the conservative Tokugawa 
shogunate to an emerging democracy under a Western-style constitution, had 
begun to roll back the unequal treaties imposed on it in the 1850s, and acquired 
the economic and the military strength to make it an emerging power in East Asia 
and the Pacific, a power that defeated China in 1895 and then Russia in 1905—
the first non-Western power to defeat a Western one.  The success of Japan in 
all these respects makes what is conventionally called the “Meiji Restoration” the 
de facto “Meiji Revolution” in evolutionary terms. 
 
44 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 318-330. 
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2. Fall of Tokugawa 
To understand this rapid evolution, one must recall several events and 
trends from the late Tokugawa era and understand several economic and social 
trends that undermined the Tokugawa regime’s conservative politics and policies.  
These were the rise of the merchant and artisan urban classes, the 
transformation of samurai into urban bureaucrats, the decline of daimyo and 
samurai livelihoods and rising indebtedness to merchants, and the social 
tensions in the rural villages.  In this context, recurrent reform movements sought 
to alleviate some of these strains in Tokugawa governance by reasserting the 
regime’s initial agrarian conservative posture—Kyoho reforms, Sadanobu’s 
reforms, and Tempo reforms are examples of such attempts—yet these attempts 
met with Western encroachment and were fruitless.48   
3. American Intervention 
Into this domestic context entered the American Commodore Matthew C. 
Perry, whose arrival constitutes the first attempt to “open” Japan.  Perry’s visit to 
Edo Bay in 1853, bearing a letter from President Millard Fillmore, marked the 
beginning of a fifteen-year period called the bakumatsu, or “end of shogunate.”49  
Subsequently, the treaty of Kanagawa was signed in 1854, which reflected the 
U.S. needs in the region.50  U.S. Consul Townsend Harris at Shimoda patiently 
negotiated broader treaties in July 1858.51
In the short span of five years, Japan’s exclusion policy became history, 
and it had acceded to its incorporation into the Western-dominated international 
system.  It had done so since the bakufu and many daimyo understood the 
superior military power of the West, and they were aware of China’s failure to 
resist the demands of the West in the first Opium War.  On a further note, the 
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impact of Japan’s opening was nothing short of revolutionary.  In the period of 15 
years from Perry’s first visit, the Tokugawa bakufu was defunct, a new regime led 
by young samurai from outlying han—mainly Choshu, Satsuma, and Tosa—
acting in the name of the Emperor Meiji was in place in Edo/Tokyo, the regime 
embarked on a series of rapid modernization programs that over the course of 
the next generation turned Japan into a regional power, and the regime had sent 
out its first diplomatic mission in 1871—the Ikuwara mission—that began Japan’s 
efforts to take its place in the Western-created international system and to 
overturn the impairment of Japanese sovereignty under the Perry and Harris 
treaties.  Thus began the Meiji Restoration at the end of bakumatsu.52
Domestically, the impact of Perry’s visit and the treaties he and Townsend 
Harris negotiated with Edo triggered a complicated struggle for power that 
ultimately brought down the bakufu.  By referring the question of how to respond 
to the Perry letter to all the daimyo and referring the treaty to the imperial court 
for the Emperor’s endorsement, the shogunate itself unintentionally helped to 
create the context in which this struggle for power played out.53
4. Revolutionary Beginning 
After an inconclusive period of competition among the han, the outer han 
agreed to collaborate against the shogunate, which was embodied in the 
Satsuma-Choshu alliance of March 1866, setting the stage for the demise of the 
shogunate.  The “opening” of Japan thus generated a political crisis domestically: 
it provided the opportunity for long-building political tensions in the Tokugawa 
structure to play out, which in turn created the foundations of a new political 
order.  The Meiji Restoration produced Japan under a new leadership with a 
relatively clearly defined agenda.  The agenda of the new government was 
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Tokugawa class restrictions, making decisions through public discussions, and 
seeking knowledge throughout the world in order to build a rich nation and a 
strong army.54
5. Revolution in Place 
Once in power in 1868-1869, the Meiji regime perceived Japan as weak 
and the West as strong, and thus it was established in an insecure international 
context.  Although Japan faced no immediate enemy at this time, it was less than 
fully sovereign because of the Western international order and unequal treaties.  
The regime recognized in its early stages that success was intimately bound to 
sweeping changes necessary to strengthen Japan domestically.  The 1871-1873 
Iwakura mission to the United States and several European states reinforced this 
impression.  When the Iwakura mission realized the scale of changes necessary 
to acquire co-equal status in the Western system, Japan began a concerted 
effort in the mid-1870s to make changes along such lines.  A westernization 
craze was taking place in Japan during the 1880s and 1890s, and only after the 
adoption of the 1889 constitution and the election of the first Diet in 1890 did 
Britain finally agree to negotiate revisions in the treaties.  Japan’s second-class 
status ended in the international order after it recovered its tariff autonomy in 
1911.  It would not be an overestimation to conclude that these changes were 
driven by Japan’s perceptions of the challenges it faced in the international 
setting.55
6. Transformation 
In this period, the Meiji Restoration accomplished political transformation, 
military transformation, economic transformation, and social and cultural 
transformation in order to bring Japan into the Western international arena as a 
co-equal power.56  The political change was evident because from the Tokugawa 
limited state, Japan became a modern nation with the monopoly of use of force 
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vested in the central government.  The 1889 constitution and creation of 
democratic forms of governance clearly indicate that Japan went through a 
thorough political transformation undertaken mainly by the leadership of the Meiji 
government, who dominated the political scene until 1910, effectively running 
Japan as an oligarchy despite the powers of the Diet after 1889.  Clarity of 
purpose that was apparent in the effort to build a modern state was also clearly 
visible in Meiji military reforms, which aimed to build a modern, national military 
that departed radically from the regionalized patterns of the past.  The Meiji 
government also transformed the economy by effective taxation, a national yen-
based currency system, creation of strategic industries, and creation of military 
industry, all of which in turn drastically increased the economic resources of state 
power.  In the cultural and social realm, Japan was quickly able to dissolve the 
Tokugawa class restrictions, gradually create legal reforms based on rights, and 
ensure compulsory education. In the end, it is clear that the Meiji restoration 
resulted in Japan’s emergence as a modern nation and a major imperialist world 
power in the early 20th century.57
7. Consequences 
It is arguable, however, whether these sweeping reforms set the stage for 
first, the Taisho democracy, and then later, the Japanese Empire at war.  Three 
views emerged to explain the consequences of the restoration.  The first one, 
Meiji confidence and pan-Asianism, posits that Tokyo simply followed the 
Western model of the other great powers.  A second viewpoint, Japan’s flawed 
modernization, asserts that the Meiji oligarchs’ modernization was inherently 
flawed since it fostered an expansionist Japan void of constitutional checks and 
balances.  A third view claims that Japan acted to secure its periphery in an era 
of accelerating great power competition.58  The important point here is that 
without understanding the Meiji restoration, it is almost impossible to interpret 
Japan’s history and foreign policy. 
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F. TAISHO DEMOCRACY 
1. End of Genro Dominance 
In 1912 emperor Meiji died, and the era of the ruling clique of elder 
statesmen (genro) was about to end.  During the era of the weak emperor Taisho 
(1912-26), the political power shifted from the genro to the parliament and the 
parties.  Japan’s unparalleled success story was accompanied by its promise to 
live up to its optimistic prospect in the first quarter of the 20th century.  By 1925, 
Japan was far more modernized and much more of a world power than at the 
close of the Russo-Japanese War.  This unparalleled success, however, turned 
to ashes in the following two decades as a result of Japan’s involvement in wars 
of increasing magnitude.59
2. Japan in the First World War 
In the First World War, Japan joined the Allied powers, but played only a 
minor role in fighting German colonial forces in East Asia.  Seizing the 
opportunity of Berlin's distraction with the European War and aiming to expand its 
sphere of influence in China, Japan declared war on Germany in August 1914 
and quickly occupied German territories in China’s Shandong Province and the 
Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall islands in the Pacific.  Japan’s hegemony in 
northern China and other parts of Asia was facilitated through two sets of 
agreements.  The first with Russia in 1916 helped further secure Japan’s 
influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.  The second with France, Britain, and 
the United States in 1917 recognized Japan’s territorial gains in China and the 
Pacific.  Toward the end of the war, Japan increasingly provided materiel for its 
European allies, thus helping to expand the country’s industry, boost its exports, 
and transform Japan from a debtor to a creditor nation.  The year 1919 saw 
Japan sitting among the great military and industrial powers of the world known 
as the “Big Five” powers at the Versailles Peace Conference.  Tokyo was 
granted a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations.  Moreover, 
the peace treaty confirmed the transfer of Germany’s rights in Shandong to 
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Japan.  Similarly, Germany’s former Pacific islands were put under a Japanese 
mandate.60  Less positively, Japan's proposal of amending a “racial equality 
clause” to the covenant of the League of Nations was rejected by the United 
States, Britain, and Australia.61
3. Interwar Years 
The post-World War I era brought Japan an unprecedented political 
prosperity.  During the 1920s, Japan progressed toward a democratic system of 
government in a movement known as “Taisho Democracy.”  However, 
parliamentary government was not rooted deeply enough to withstand the 
economic and political pressures of the late 1920s and 1930s during which 
military leaders became increasingly influential.62  This was mainly due to the 
contending forces that reached its peak during the reign of weak and mentally-ill 
Emperor Taisho, which is when political parties grew in importance.63  From 
1918 to 1932 is when parties were especially powerful, and prime ministers were 
selected from among the party leaders;64 however, the existing political parties at 
the time were elite based, rather than mass-based, organizations.65  In such a 
political context, party members worked closely with the military, bureaucracy, 
and the court, but the political system in Japan was moving towards a democracy 
with one significant limitation to substantive change: the Meiji constitutional order.  
Despite the aforementioned order, popular political consciousness was growing, 
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period.  It was rather a significant step towards democracy in 1925 when Japan 
introduced universal male suffrage, which increased the size of the electorate 
fourfold to almost 13 million.66
4. End of Democracy 
However, emerging Chinese nationalism, the victory of the communists in 
Russia, and the growing presence of the United States in East Asia all worked 
against Japan’s postwar foreign policy interests.  In addition, the four-year 
Siberian expedition and activities in China, combined with big domestic spending 
programs, had depleted Japan's wartime earnings.  Only through more 
competitive business practices, supported by further economic development and 
industrial modernization could Japan hope to become predominant in Asia.67  On 
the other hand, in addition to the Washington Conference of 1921-22, in 1928, 
Japan joined 14 other nations in signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which 
denounced “recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.”68  
Thus, when Japan invaded Manchuria only three years later, its pretext was the 
defense of its nationals and economic interests there. 
G. JAPANESE EMPIRE 
1. The Roots of Imperialism 
Ultranationalism was characteristic of right-wing politicians and 
conservative military men since the inception of the Meiji Restoration, 
contributing greatly to the prowar politics of the 1870s.  Disenchanted former 
samurai had established patriotic societies and intelligence-gathering 
organizations.  These groups became active in domestic and foreign politics, 
helped foment prowar sentiments, and supported ultranationalist causes through 
the end of World War II.  After Japan’s victories over China and Russia, the 
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ultranationalists concentrated on domestic issues and perceived domestic 
threats, such as socialism and communism.69
After World War I and the intellectual ferment of the period, nationalist 
societies became numerous but had a minority voice during the era of two-party 
democratic politics.  Diverse and angry groups called for nationalization of all 
wealth above a fixed minimal amount and for armed overseas expansion.  The 
emperor was highly revered by these groups, and when Hirohito was enthroned 
in 1927, initiating the Showa period, there were calls for a “Showa Restoration” 
and a revival of Shinto.70  Emperor-centered neo-Shintoism, or State Shinto, 
which had long been developing, came to fruition in the 1930s and 1940s.  It 
glorified the emperor and traditional Japanese virtues to the exclusion of Western 
influences, which were perceived as greedy, individualistic, bourgeois, and 
assertive.  The ideals of the Japanese family-state and self-sacrifice in service of 
the nation were given a missionary interpretation and were thought by their 
ultranationalist proponents to be applicable to the modern world.71
2. Slithering into the Second World War  
The 1930s were a decade of fear in Japan, characterized by the 
resurgence of right-wing patriotism, the weakening of democratic forces, 
domestic terrorist violence, and stepped-up military aggression abroad.  A 
prelude to this state of affairs was Tanaka Giichi's term as prime minister from 
1927 to 1929.  He sent troops to China twice to obstruct Chiang Kai-shek’s 
unification campaign.  In June 1928, adventurist officers of the Guandong Army, 
the Imperial Japanese Army unit stationed in Manchuria, embarked on 
unauthorized initiatives.  The Japanese system of party government finally met 
its demise in 1932, when a group of junior naval officers and army cadets 
assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi.  Inukai’s successors, military men 
chosen by Saionji, the last surviving genro, recognized Manchukuo and generally 
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approved the army's actions in securing Manchuria as an industrial base, an area 
for Japanese emigration, and a staging ground for war with the Soviet Union.  In 
the February 26th Incident of 1936, about 1,500 troops went on a rampage of 
assassination against the current and former prime ministers.  Other military units 
put down the revolt, but Japan’s civilian leadership capitulated to the army’s 
demands in the hope of ending domestic violence.72
3. German and Japanese Coalition 
In November 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact, an agreement to exchange 
information and cooperate with each other in preventing communist activities, 
was signed by Japan and Germany, to which Italians became a party a year 
later.73  War was launched against China after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 
July 7, 1937.  Supposedly, an unexpected conflict took place near Beijing 
between Chinese and Japanese troops and quickly escalated into full-scale 
warfare.  The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) ensued, and relations with 
the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union deteriorated.74
4. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
Under the prime ministership of Konoe Fumimaro75 (1891-1945)—the last 
head of the famous Fujiwara house—the government was streamlined and given 
absolute power over the nation’s assets.76  In 1940, the 2,600th anniversary of 
the founding of Japan, according to tradition, Konoe’s cabinet called for the 
establishment of a “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” a concept building 
on Konoe’s 1938 call for a “New Order in Greater East Asia,” encompassing 
Japan, Manchukuo, China, and Southeast Asia.77  The Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere was to integrate Asia politically and economically—under 
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73 Iriye, 50-54 and Dolan and Worden, “Japan: A Country Study,” On-line book. 
74 McClain, 401 and 442-447. 
75 Konoe was in office during the years 1937-1939 and 1940-1941. 
76 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 715-717.  See also McClain, 451-455 and Duus, 222-
227. 
77 Iriye, 131-143. 
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Japanese leadership—against Western domination and was developed in 
recognition of the changing geopolitical situation emerging in 1940.  In 1942, the 
Greater East Asia Ministry was established, and in 1943, the Greater East Asia 
Conference was held in Tokyo.78
5. Tripartite Pact   
Also in 1940, political parties were ordered to dissolve, and the Imperial 
Rule Assistance Association, comprising members of all former parties, was 
established to transmit government orders throughout society.  In September 
1940, Japan joined the Axis alliance with Germany and Italy when it signed the 
Tripartite Pact, a military agreement to re-divide the world that was directed 
primarily against the United States.79   
6. Relations with the United States 
There had been a long-standing and deep-seated antagonism between 
Japan and the United States since the first decade of the 20th century.  Each 
perceived the other as a military threat.  The Japanese greatly resented the racial 
discrimination perpetuated by United States immigration laws, and the Americans 
became increasingly wary of Japan’s interference in the self-determination of 
other peoples.  Japan’s military expansionism and quest for national self-
sufficiency eventually led the United States in 1940 to embargo war supplies, 
abrogate a long-standing commercial treaty, and put greater restrictions on the 
export of critical commodities.  These American tactics, rather than forcing Japan 
to a standstill, made Japan more desperate.  After signing the Japanese-Soviet 
Neutrality Pact in April 1941, Japan participated in diplomatic negotiations with 
Washington aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement.  Washington, concerned 
about Japan’s role in the Tripartite Pact, demanded the withdrawal of Japanese 
troops from China and Southeast Asia.  Japan countered that it would not use 
force unless the United States attacked Germany or Italy.  Further, Japan 
demanded that the United States and Britain not interfere with a Japanese 
 
78 Iriye, 131-143. 
79 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 717-718.  See also McClain 473-475. 
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settlement in China.  Since certain Japanese military leaders were working at 
cross-purposes with officials seeking a peaceful settlement talks were 
deadlocked.80
7. Pearl Harbor Attack   
On October 15, 1941, Army Minister Tojo Hideki (1884-1948) declared the 
negotiations ended.  Konoe resigned and was replaced by Tojo.  After the final 
United States refusal of Japan’s terms of negotiation, on 1 December 1941, the 
Imperial Conference ratified the decision to embark on a war of “self-defense and 
self-preservation” and to attack the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor.  
After initial naval and battlefield successes and a tremendous overextension of 
its resources in the war against a quickly mobilizing United States and Allied war 
effort, Japan was unable to sustain a “Greater East Asia.”81
8. Japanese Defeat   
As early as 1943, Konoe led a peace movement, and Tojo was forced 
from office in July 1944.82  His successors sought a peace negotiation, but the 
United States offered only unconditional surrender.  After the detonation of 
atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 8, 1945, 
respectively, the emperor asked that the Japanese people bring peace to Japan 
by “enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable” by surrendering 
to the Allied powers.83  The official instrument of surrender was signed on board 
the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945.84  The terms of 
surrender included the occupation of Japan by Allied military forces, assurances 
that Japan would never again go to war, restriction of Japanese sovereignty to 
the four main islands “and such minor islands as may be determined,” and 
surrender of Japan’s colonial holdings.85
 
80 McClain, 476-481.  See also Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 718-721 and 813-815.  
81 Iriye, 181-185. 
82 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 824. 
83 Ibid, 816.  Also see, McClain 515. 
84 Keylor, 245.  Also see, McClain, 523.  
85 McClain, 524-528.  Also see Duus, 244-250. 
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H. POSTWAR JAPAN 
1. Occupation Years 
After World War II had ended, Japan was devastated.  The Pacific War left 
all the large cities with the exception of Kyoto, the industries, and the 
transportation networks severely damaged.  A severe food shortage continued to 
affect the Japanese for several years.86  A period of demilitarization and 
democratization followed in Japan between 1945 and 1947.  Under the direction 
of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
(SCAP), Japan’s army and navy ministries were abolished, munitions and military 
equipment were destroyed, and war industries were transformed into civilian 
uses.  War crimes trials found 4,200 Japanese officials guilty; 700 were 
executed, and 186,000 other public figures were purged.  State Shinto was 
disestablished, and on 1 January 1946, Emperor Hirohito repudiated his 
divinity.87   
MacArthur pushed the government to amend the 1889 Meiji Constitution.  
On 3 May 1947, the new Japanese constitution came into force.88  Constitutional 
reforms were accompanied by economic reforms, including agricultural land 
redistribution, reinstatement of trade unions, and severe proscriptions on 
zaibatsu.  MacArthur intended to break up power concentrations by dissolving 
the zaibatsu and other large companies, and by decentralizing the education 
system and the police.  In land reform, concentrations in land ownership were 
removed.  Especially during the first half of the occupation, Japan's media was 
subject to a rigid censorship of any anti-American statements and controversial 
topics such as the race issue.89
 
86 McClain, 528-533. 
87 Ibid, 529-550.  Also see, Duus, 259-268. 
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The relatively rapid stabilization of Japan led to a relaxation of SCAP 
purges and press censorship.  Quick economic recovery was encouraged, 
restrictions on former zaibatsu members eventually were lifted, and foreign trade 
was allowed.90  Finally, in September 1951, 51 nations met in San Francisco to 
reach a peace accord with Japan.  China, India, and the Soviet Union 
participated in the conference but did not sign the treaty, formally known as the 
Treaty of Peace.91  Japan renounced its claims to Korea, Taiwan, Penghu, the 
Kuril Islands, southern Sakhalin, islands it had gained by League of Nations 
mandate, South China Sea islands, and Antarctic territory, while agreeing to 
settle disputes peacefully according to the United Nations Charter.  Japan's rights 
to defend itself and to enter into collective security arrangements were 
acknowledged.  The 1952 ratification of the Japan-United States Mutual Security 
Assistance Pact also ensured a strong defense for Japan and a large postwar 
role in Asia for the United States.92   
2. Occupation’s Aftermath 
With the peace treaty that went into effect in 1952, the occupation ended 
on 28 April 1952.  Japan's Self-Defense Forces were established in 1954, 
accompanied by large public demonstrations.  Great public turbulence was also 
caused by the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960.  After the 
Korean War, and accelerated by it, Japan's economy flourished.  The economic 
growth resulted in a quick rise of the living standards, changes in society and the 
stabilization of the ruling position of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).  Japan's 
relations with the Soviet Union were normalized in 1956, and the ones with China 
in 1972. 
3. LDP Dominance and the Economic Miracle 
Three years after Japan's independence, the fledgling predecessor of the 
LDP achieved a majority in the Diet of Japan, which would be unchallenged 
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under the LDP until the 1990s.  The LDP government, through institutions such 
as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), encouraged Japanese 
industrial development overseas while imposing restrictions on foreign 
companies willing to do business within the country.93  These practices, coupled 
with a dependence on the United States for defense, allowed Japan's economy 
to increase exponentially during the Cold War.  The 1973 oil crisis shocked the 
Japanese economy, which heavily depended on oil.  The reaction was a shift to 
high technology industries.94  By 1980, many Japanese products, particularly 
automobiles and electronics, were being exported around the world, and Japan's 
industrial sector was the second largest in the world after the United States.  This 
growth pattern continued unabatedly until the 1990s, when the Japanese 
economy finally collapsed. 95
From the 1950s to the 1980s, Japan’s history consists mainly of its rapid 
development into a first-rank economic power, through a process often referred 
to as the “economic miracle.”  The post-war settlement transformed Japan into a 
constitutional party democracy, but it was ruled by a single party throughout the 
period of the “miracle.”96  This strength and stability allowed the government 
substantial freedom to manage economic development in the long term.  
Through extensive state investment and guidance, and with a kick-start provided 
by technology transfer from the United States and Europe, Japan quickly rebuilt 
its heavy industrial sector.  Given a massive boost by the Korean War, in which it 
acted as a major supplier to the United Nations force, Japan’s economy started 
an extended period of exceptionally rapid growth, led by the manufacturing 
sectors.  Japan emerged as a significant power in many economic spheres, 
including steel working, car manufacturing, and the manufacture of electronic 
 
93 McClain, 565-571. 
94 Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 828-860. 
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goods.97  Throughout this period, its annual GNP growth was over twice that of 
its nearest competitor, the United States.  By the 1980s, Japan, despite its small 
size, had the world’s second largest economy.98  These developments had a 
marked effect on its relations with the United States, Japan’s closest ally.  The 
United Sates initially heavily encouraged Japan's development, seeing a strong 
Japan as a necessary counterbalance to Communist China.99
4. Bitter Economic Relations with the United States 
By the 1980s, the sheer strength of the Japanese economy had become a 
protruding point because the United States had a massive trade deficit with 
Japan; that is, it imported considerably more from Japan than it exported to it.  
This deficit became a scapegoat for American economic weakness, and relations 
between the two cooled substantially.100  There was particular friction over the 
issue of Japanese automobile exports, as Japanese automobiles by this point 
accounted for over 30% of the American market.101  The U.S. also heavily 
criticized the closed nature of the Japanese economy, which was marked by 
heavy tariff protection.  As a result, it was very difficult for foreign firms to enter 
into the Japanese market.  Japan throughout the 1980s and 1990s maintained a 
process of economic liberalization aimed at appeasing American criticism.  The 
automobile issue was dealt with through a series of “voluntary” restrictions on 
Japanese exports and by making factories in America.102
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III.  POSTWAR JAPANESE POLITICS AND THE POST-COLD 
WAR ERA JAPAN 
A. ASSESSMENT OF POSTWAR JAPANESE POLITICS 
Japan has been in the center of regional politics in the Asia-Pacific region 
since the early 20th century, and it surfaced as the most dynamic economic 
center in Asia after the Second World War.  Japan is not only a regional power; 
in fact, its economy has global significance and its geopolitical location rests in 
the heart of the American, Chinese, and Russian interests.103  Yet, it remains 
unclear for Japan and the rest of the world what Japan’s role is in the global 
context.  Japan has been very quiet and inactive in world political affairs ever 
since the end of the Second World War.  Many scholars attribute this lack of 
activity to the assumption of responsibility for Japanese security by the United 
States.  The Japanese domestic politics that emerged after 1952 also played a 
significant role in Japanese anti-militarism and pacifism.104
As Japan rapidly rose to be an economic giant in the postwar years, and 
with the demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War, 
more questions have become the subject of heated discussion regarding 
Japanese economic strength.  Even though as of this writing there has been a 
lengthy period of Junichiro Koizumi’s premiership in which there has been a 
steady and determined set of international policies, it is still not well known how 
Japan will define and defend its national security. 
1. Occupation, Reform, and Recovery  
After losing the Pacific War, Japan was occupied by the Allied Forces in 
1945.  The occupation, mainly conducted by the United States, continued until 
1952.  In 1952, the United States turned over the administration to the Japanese, 
 
103 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, second and revised 
edition, (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 186-203.  
104 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms 
and Policy Responses in a Changing World, (Ithaca, New York: East Asia program, Cornell 
University, 1993), xi.    
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except in a few areas such as Okinawa, all of which were to be returned by 1972.  
Even though Japan was raised to an equal footing with the rest of the countries 
in the world, it still heavily depended on U.S support.  Thus, ever since it was 
occupied, Japan has provided much economically yet little militarily for its own 
defense, and the United States has shouldered the military burden of Japan’s 
external security.105  
During the occupation years, the United States managed the process of 
demilitarization and democratization of Japan.  Major changes were made in 
political, social, and economic institutions and practices.  During this seven-year 
occupation, Japan had literally no control over its foreign affairs and became, in 
effect, a ward of the United States on the international scene.  It adopted a new 
constitution in 1947, Article 9 of which openly states the permanent 
renouncement of war and the threat or use of force by the Japanese people.106
The United States provided Japanese defense and sustained a free trade 
order that let Japan practice its own commercial interests throughout the Cold 
War.  Japan chose not to partake in collective security arrangements throughout 
this period and avoided international strategic affairs.107  Japan followed the 
United States’ lead in international affairs during the 1950s and the 1960s, 
although it refused to share some of the responsibilities.  Japanese foreign policy 
became somewhat independent after 1971 when the Nixon administration failed 
to inform Japan in advance about Sino-American rapprochement; however, it did 
not change fundamentally, as it continued to be reactive and defensive in 
avoiding international conflicts. 
 
105 Although Japanese security was mostly provided by the U.S. military, Japan provided the 
economic aspects of it as part of its host nation support.  Japanese host nation support accounts 
for more than 70 percent of the U.S. military expenditures in Japan according to the Japanese 
Bluebook 2004 published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/index.html.    
106 Official Website of Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, The Constitution of Japan, 
available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html, 
accessed on 3 June 2005.    
107 Yahuda, 186-203. 
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2. Confrontation Politics, the Economic Miracle, and Japanese 
Conservatism 
During the 1950s and 1960s, three basic principles directed Japan’s 
foreign policy actions.  First, Japan chose to cooperate closely with the United 
States for both security and economic reasons.  Second, Japan supported the 
promotion of a free-trade system that was friendly to its own economic needs.  
Lastly, Japan favored international cooperation through the United Nations—to 
which it was admitted in 1956—and other multilateral bodies.  As Japan adhered 
to these principles with increasing enthusiasm, it experienced a phenomenal 
economic recovery and growth during the first two decades after the end of the 
occupation.108
Japanese people and politicians, despite the provision of basic protection 
to Japan by the United States, did not always embrace the American presence.  
For example, during the Johnson administration, relations with the Japanese 
circled largely around the war in Vietnam.  This resulted in tremendous stress as 
the Japanese public was strongly opposed to the war and Johnson was 
unsatisfied with Japan’s unwillingness to involve itself more vigorously in Asian 
security affairs.  This tension was partially resolved at the 1967 Johnson-Sato 
summit when Prime Minister Sato Eisaku agreed to support the U.S. position in 
return for greater Japanese involvement in Okinawa.109  The 1969 Nixon-Sato 
summit resulted in Japan’s agreement to recognize its own interest in 
maintaining security in the region.  The acknowledgment by Japan of its own 
security responsibilities, on the other hand, did not suffice for the Nixon 
administration.  Nixon saw a greater need for Asian states to provide for their 
own defense.  The “Nixon Doctrine,”110 as it came to be called, emphasized the 
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principle that while the United States would support maintaining a nation’s 
security, it was that nation’s chief responsibility to provide for its own security.  
Policies of the Nixon administration mainly aimed at reducing Japan’s 
mercantilist approach to trade and bringing Japan closer to normalizing its status 
in the international community.  Relations between Washington and Tokyo were 
not, however, always confrontational. 
The basic principles of Japanese foreign policy did not change in the 
1970s, but pressure at home and abroad led Japan to approach its foreign policy 
from a new perspective.  Domestic pressures on the government to exercise 
more foreign policy initiatives independent of the United States gradually 
increased.  The surprise United States opening to China and other regional 
issues required a more independent Japanese foreign policy.111  The nation's 
exceptional economic growth had made it a foremost world economic power by 
the early 1970s and had created a sense of pride and self-esteem, particularly 
among the younger generation.  The demand for a more independent foreign 
policy was a reflection of this enhanced self-image, yet at the same time, 
Japanese people continued to embrace pacifism wholeheartedly. 
3. Social and Political Change 
It is almost compelling for one to say that not only Japanese political 
culture112 and strategic culture,113 but also Japanese culture in general became 
pacifist in nature.  This characteristic of the Japanese people may easily be 
attributed to their deeply rooted culture of respect, which leads them to highly 
regard the decisions made on their behalf—even if they disagree with the 
 
111 Dolan and Worden, “Japan: A Country Study,” On-line book. 
112 By political culture, I use Sydney Verba and Gabriel Almond’s definition quoted in Jeffrey 
S. Lantis’s “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” published in International Studies 
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“Thinking About Strategic Culture,” published in International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 
1995), 47.  He defines strategic culture as the formation of a setting or environment of imprecise 
thought processes, which limits behavioral choices, and it can play a role in establishing long 
lasting preferences in interstate political affairs in his influential work. 
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decision—by the ruling elite as exemplified throughout their history.114  Thus, 
these attributes, combined with the restrictive 1947 Constitution, caused Japan to 
refrain from creating a large military, developing a military doctrine, and building 
a military industrial complex.  As the United States continued to provide defense 
for Japan throughout the most hectic years of the Cold War, a specific culture in 
Japan started to take shape.  The horrors of the Second World War, the 
economic problems experienced thereafter, loss of freedom in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, and Japanese geopolitical isolation for centuries contributed 
to the development of a specific culture, with a pacifist nature, that prevents 
Japan from becoming belligerent, pursuing aggressive foreign policies, and 
building a sufficiently strong military to defend itself.115  As a result, many 
scholars, Japanese and foreign, have posited different views on Japanese 
sovereignty. 
4. Japan and the Notion of Sovereignty  
States in the international system have varying degrees of autonomous 
power.  Supreme authority, or sovereignty, of particular states can vary 
dramatically over time, and some scholars and statesmen today reject the 
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Westphalian notion of sovereignty—sovereignty of nation-states.116  However, 
sovereignty, in dictionary terms, is the exclusive right to exercise supreme 
authority over a geographic region, group of people, or oneself.  Sovereignty over 
a nation is generally vested in a government or other political agency, although 
there are cases where it is held by an individual.  This notion of sovereignty 
brings forth the concept of normalcy; that is, defining what constitutes a normal 
country.  As stated earlier, this study concentrates on the normalcy of Japan.  
Normal statehood was denied to Japan in the period between 1945 and 1952 as 
these were occupation years.117  Japan never fully returned to normalcy after the 
occupation because it never organized itself as a sovereign entity that could 
ultimately defend itself.  Although a free democracy, Japan is not completely 
normal in the sense that it does not have the power to defend itself from external 
threats, it avoids collective security initiatives, and it depends mostly on the 
United States security umbrella for its defense.  The current debate in Japan on 
making changes to its 1947 Constitution and building a strong enough military to 
not only defend itself, but also contribute to international peace operations 
overseas, and thus assist the United States, has become an important issue in 
Japanese politics. 
B. JAPANESE SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
Japan's security role in both regional and international affairs has 
experienced a marked shift from that which it used to play during the Cold War.  
Japanese foreign policy during the Cold War rested on two pillars: first, Japan 
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pursued economic diplomacy while avoiding any political role in international 
security affairs; and second, Japan entrusted its stake in regional security to the 
United States.  In the early 1980s, when the Soviet-American military competition 
was intensifying, Japan took salient steps to strengthen its defense policy and 
security alliance with the United States. Although sufficient for the Cold War 
threat, these steps in strengthening the Japanese military did not qualify as being 
satisfactory for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis.  Domestic politics coupled with 
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prevented Japan from providing the 
necessary support for the United States.  After this point, Japanese passivity 
towards security affairs came under scrutiny at the onset of the post-Cold War 
era.118
In the post-Cold War environment, Japan, still reluctant to partake in 
international security challenges, continues to pursue a comprehensive security 
strategy integrating its security and economic interests.  Japan has readjusted its 
strategy in four ways.  It has expanded its defense cooperation with the United 
States, it asserts itself more confidently in defending its own territory, it provides 
non-combat support in the global war on terrorism, and it substantially supports 
East Asian economic integration and cooperation.  Koizumi’s much-criticized 
support for the war on terrorism and stronger alliance with the United States 
created greater room for Japan to maneuver autonomously in pursuing its foreign 
policy in Asia and beyond.119      
1. Renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 
After the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis and the 1995-96 Chinese 
missile tests near Taiwan, Japanese measures of restricting themselves from 
military strengthening received caustic criticism.  Since then, the steps Japan has 
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taken indicate preparation for normalization.120  Prime Minister Ryutaru 
Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton signed a Joint Declaration on Security on 
17 April 1996, which was a revision of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan 
Defense Cooperation.  The agreement declared that the U.S.-Japan security 
treaty of 1960 “remains the cornerstone” of their policies, that their combined 
forces in Japan would engage in policy coordination for dealing with regional 
crises, and on a reciprocal basis provide equipment and supplies.121  The U.S.-
Japan security treaty justifies the Self-Defense Forces and, from this point of 
view, the treaty stands above the constitution, which is supposed to act as the 
highest law of the land.  The security treaty is the guarantor of authority and 
order.  According to Mary Jordan, almost all discussion stops when the treaty is 
invoked, and nothing else in Japan comes close to having this kind of authority 
and effect.122  The Japanese even made a commitment to move forward for 
closer relations with the United States, and in May 1999, the Japanese 
Parliament approved legislation that further expanded the country’s military 
partnership with the United States.123  
2. Post-September 11 Trends 
The evolution of Japanese foreign policy after the September 11 terrorist 
attacks does not indicate a significant departure from its traditional 
comprehensive economic and security strategy, but it does make it apparent that 
Japan has recalibrated its policy by expanding its international security role and 
promoting East Asian integration.  Although he appeared more assertive than his 
predecessors, Koizumi so far chose to remain within the bounds of the 
constitutional constraints regarding security policy, which has been reassuring to 
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Japan’s Asian neighbors.124  However, certain moves toward regional integration 
by Japan have come into sight recently.  The Japanese Self-Defense Forces 
formally participated in a multilateral military exercise; the biggest war games in 
Asia called the Cobra Drills, on 2 May 2005 in waters off Thailand for the first 
time since the Second World War.125
3. Constitutional Revision 
There is in Japan a growing mood in favor of constitutional revision. The 
Diet’s long-time constitutional guardian, the opposition Socialist Party, collapsed 
with the end of the Cold War, and many members of the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party have begun to take seriously the party platform for 
constitutional revision that had long been nominal. Therefore, in 2000, the Diet 
established committees to review the constitution.  Those who want a revision 
are calling for a new constitution in five to ten years. 
4. Post-Cold War Japanese Foreign Policy Evolution 
In the post-Cold War period, as interdependence has become deeper in 
all fields, ensuring world peace and prosperity became indispensable for the 
peace and prosperity of Japan itself.  Japan, with its economic strength 
exceeded only by the European Union (EU) as a whole and the United States, 
became a tremendously influential country not simply on economic affairs but on 
all major issues of importance to the international community, including political 
and global-scale issues.  Japanese foreign policy starting in the early 1990s 
indicated that Japan aimed to lead active and creative diplomacy in cooperation 
with other major countries by setting forth a direction to be taken toward the 
creation of a new international framework.  Japan's role as an Asian 
industrialized democratic country became increasingly important.126  Japanese 
cooperation in the Gulf Crisis and in Cambodia brought about a change in the 
 
124 Mochizuki, 127. 
125 “Pacifist Japan to Join Asia’s Largest Annual War Games,” DefenseNews.com, On-line 
article, available at http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050421364480.html, 19 April 2005.    
126 “Diplomatic Bluebook 2003,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website, 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/index.html, accessed on 6 June 
2005.   
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perception of pacifism; that is to say, support was gradually spreading for a 
pacifist notion which consisted of contributing more actively to ensure the peace 
and prosperity of the entire world, and going beyond the simple pacifism of not 
becoming a military power and not invading other countries.127  Japan’s annual 
foreign policy statement in 1994 stated: 
In today's international community, as clearly epitomized in the 
response to the Gulf Crisis, any single country, even the United 
States, can neither settle international problems nor ensure the 
peace and prosperity of the international community.  Moreover, 
any task that the international community is faced with, whether it is 
the recovery of sustainable growth of the world economy, global-
scale problems such as the environment, or the strengthening of 
the regimes of non-proliferation, cannot be tackled without 
multilateral cooperation.  On the other hand, a single major country 
can impede solution of the problems by refusing to cooperate in an 
international effort. It has therefore, become increasingly important 
to ensure multilateral coordination led by major countries, in order 
to sustain and promote peace and prosperity.128  
The continued growth of Japan's foreign aid appears to be motivated by 
two fundamental factors.  First, Japanese policy is aimed at assuming 
international responsibilities commensurate with its position as a global economic 
power.  Second, many believed, the growing Japanese foreign aid program 
comes largely in response to pressures from the United States and other allies 
for Japan to take on a greater share of the financial burdens in support of shared 
security, political, and economic interests.  In 2005, Japan began a two-year term 
as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.129   
In the end, Japanese foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War world 
focused on three major areas.  In the political realm, Japan strived to ensure its 
 
127 “Diplomatic Bluebook 1995,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website, 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1995/index.html, accessed on 6 June 
2005. 
128 “Diplomatic Bluebook 1994,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website, 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1994/index.html accessed on 6 June 
2005.  
129 “Japan,” The World Factbook, CIA, available at 
http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ja.html, accessed on 4 June 2005. 
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own security through its alliance with the United States, increasing its defense 
capabilities, and promotion of diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace and 
security.  Japan also adopted a comprehensive approach that dealt with regional 
conflicts and promotion of arms control and disarmament and strengthening the 
Non-Proliferation Regime.  Japan, in the international economic realm, aimed at 
ensuring sustainable growth of the world economy and undertook a role to 
provide support for developing countries and countries in transition.  Along with 
the multilateral cooperation mentioned above, moves toward regional 
cooperation became increasingly active both in political and economic fields.  In 
the regional realm, moves for Asia-Pacific regional cooperation steadily 
progressed, and in particular, against the background of spectacular economic 
development in the region, much attention was paid to the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) organization.  Moreover, while regional cooperation in this 
area has so far been mainly a vertical one formed through increased bilateral 
economic cooperation and direct investments, there has also been progress 
recently in horizontal cooperative relations, such as the Japan-ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries’ initiative toward the 
development of Indochina.  In the political arena, the creation of the “ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF)” was agreed upon in July 1993 as a forum for multilateral 
consultations on the security issues of the Asia-Pacific region, and the inaugural 
meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994.130
It was in this context that Japan signaled its intention to seek permanent 
membership in the United Nations Security Council.  The Japanese felt that as 
the second largest economy in the world and the leading supplier of the 
development assistance combined with the substantial amounts of funds 
provided to the United Nations, Japan not only had the credentials, but also 
deserved to be a permanent member of the Security Council.  It was also in this 
context that Japan went forward in revitalizing its security alliance with the United 
 
130“About Us,” The ASEAN Regional Forum Official Website, available at 
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/Default.aspx?tabid=49, accessed on 11 October 2005. 
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States in 1996, legalizing active logistical support for American troops conducting 
military operations in the region.  After September 11, the boundaries of the 
support were widened to include the Indian Ocean, and moreover, Japan sent 
950 military personnel to Iraq to participate in non-combat roles.131  As these 
events were occurring and the developments and intricacies of the post-Cold 
War era were unraveling, Japan was faced with different options for 
strengthening its military and revising its constitution along the path to becoming 
a normal country. 
C. WHITHER JAPAN? 
Facing a series of dilemmas, Japan moves along in the 21st century.  Is it 
possible for Japan to continue to grow as a world economic leader without 
assuming a greater political role?  In that context, is it rational for Japan to be 
considered a political leader when it cannot even provide for the security of its 
own territory without foreign assistance?  Those countries trading with Japan 
complain that it enjoys an unfair advantage, but when Japanese firms invest in 
their economies, they raise the issue of Japanese domination.  After each 
international crisis, Western powers call on Japan to "contribute its fair share" to 
the peacekeeping forces.  At the same time, a significant number of the 
Japanese people and their Asian neighbors demand that there be no extension 
of Japanese military power beyond its borders so that the terrible events of the 




131 “Diplomatic Bluebook 2004,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website, 
available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/blubook/2004, 18, accessed on 7 September 2005.    
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IV. JAPANESE NORMALIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The end of the Cold War directly affected and partially altered Japanese 
politics and Japan’s international environment. Despite that, Japan continues to 
restrict itself from shouldering the role of a truly independent country.  To a great 
extent, it has persisted in viewing itself as a pacifist country, a consensus which 
is bolstered by its peace constitution.132  Even though with the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union, the main threat around which the U.S.-Japan alliance was 
formed during the gloomy years of the Cold War disappeared, the security 
alliance with the United States has continued to be the foundation of Japanese 
foreign and national security policies.  Nevertheless, Japan started to modify its 
approaches and initiatives within the confines of the alliance in such a fashion 
that suggested that the country, although slowly and cautiously, was establishing 
a new international role for itself.  This development period stimulated a heated 
debate in Japan. 
It was during this episode that three different viewpoints surfaced in 
Japanese political and academic circles.  The then-Liberal Democratic Party 
Secretary General, Ichiro Ozawa, initially voiced one view, which is essentially a 
nationalist view.  He proposed that Japan should become a “normal country”; that 
is, that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces should be able to fight alongside their 
allies in a multilateral force and participate in peace operations around the world.  
A second view that surfaced during this time among liberals was the idea of 
establishing a Japanese constitutional basis for contribution to United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.  A third view, held among those who have been 
advocating a pacifist Japanese culture and national security strategy, posits that 
a revival of militarist Japanese politics and society is still possible, and that any 
constitutional reform must be postponed until the deeply entrenched martial 
 
132 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, second and revised 
edition, (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 314.   
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values utterly vanish.  Roughly fifteen years have passed since the end of the 
Cold War, and Japan has yet to make a determined move towards the 
aforementioned nationalist, liberal, and leftist approaches, respectively. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze Japanese normalization in the 
context of strengthening its military and assess Japan’s options for normalizing.  
Should Japan become a “normal country?”133  And if yes, why?  This study will 
argue that Japan should become a normal country because it would benefit 
Japanese interests in a threefold way: 
• First, it would advance Japan’s regional leadership and would 
increase Japan’s global significance,  
• Second, it would increase the likelihood of Japan’s accession to the 
United Nations Security Council as a permanent member, which 
then would increase Japanese influence on world affairs, 
• Third, it would improve Japan’s economy in both the short and the 
long run.134   
This study will show the abovementioned argument by first giving a brief 
background on how Japan came to this point, then by describing what 
normalization entails and what the term “normal country” means, and finally by 
reviewing Japanese foreign and national security policies in the post-Cold War 
period.  The study will then lay out Japan’s options and will assess each option in 
terms of Japanese national interests.  Following that, this study will evaluate 
which option better suits Japanese interests, which will then be followed by a 
section describing how such normalization can be implemented.  The study 
concludes with a summary of findings and some tentative conclusions.   
 
133 The “Normal Country” debate about Japan has been discussed ever since the end of the 
Cold War.  Ichiro Ozawa was one of the first politicians to voice it outspokenly.  However, there 
have been a number of different prescriptions for Japanese normalization.  Thus, when the 
expression “normal country” is used in this study, it has a rather general meaning that 
encompasses all of the potential prescriptions, not just Ichiro Ozawa’s approach.     
134 This claim assumes that Japan would profit from military exports; however, this is a highly 
debated claim among political economists.  Some political economists argue that military exports 
may have a negative growth effect.  In this study, Japan’s military exports are considered to be 
competitive with other Western countries.  This would lead Japan to easily obtain a market share 
of arms exports.  Besides, as Japan strengthens its military, the military industrial complex will 
sell arms to the Japanese SDF, which will cause the Japanese economy to remain dynamic.    
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B. NORMAL COUNTRY AND THE CURRENT DEBATE ON JAPANESE 
NORMALCY 
Japanese foreign policy has often been described as anomalous, if not 
aberrant or abnormal, in terms of ‘normal’ industrial powers.135  After the Second 
World War, Japan was reincorporated into the advanced industrial world as a 
“semisovereign” power; an aspect of which is, it accepted unprecedented 
constitutional constraints in its military capacity and independence.136  Thus, it 
became unusually dependent per se on the array of U.S.-led regional and 
multilateral economic and security institutions.  These institutions provide Japan 
with a political bulwark of stability that far transcends the institutions’ more 
immediate and practical purposes.137  The security relationship between the 
United States and Japan is best depicted by “binding,” with the United States 
doing most of the “advising” and Japan most of the “accepting.”  Since the mid-
1970s, the defense cooperation has increased smoothly and apparently to the 
satisfaction of both governments.138
The problems surrounding Japan’s search for a normal role stem from the 
fact that Japan is not a normal country; it is a huge economic power yet a political 
pygmy—a distortion that occurred as a result of the strategy pursued by the 
United States during the Cold War.139  First coined and popularized by Japanese 
political leader Ozawa Ichiro due to the inadequate Japanese response to the 
Persian Gulf Crisis in 1990-1991, normalization has been the shorthand to 
characterize the recent trends in Japanese security policy.  Ozawa urged his 
country to discard its erroneous and imprudent “one-country pacifism,” and 
 
135 The Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation, “Is Japan a ‘Normal’ Power?  Japanese 
Leadership and Asian Regional Organizations,” On-line, available at http://www.daiwa-
foundation.org.uk, 30 August 2005.    
136 The term “semisovereign” was first introduced by Peter J. Katzenstein in his book Policy 
and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1987).   
137 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2001), 249-250.   
138 Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 80.     
139 Chalmers Johnson, “Japan in Search of a ‘Normal’ Role,” IGCC Policy paper 3, July 
1992.   
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become simply a “normal” country, which was capable of defending itself from 
external threats without heavily relying on another country—namely the United 
States.  This suggestion, however, was never intended to imply reverting to pre-
1945 militarism.140  The Japanese constitutional constraints established during 
the occupation years mean that Japan has not possessed normal statehood for 
more than half a century.141  This, then, leads one to ask what constitutes a 
normal state.    
In short, a state can be described as an organized political community 
controlling a definite territory, having organized, functional governmental 
institutions, and possessing internal and external sovereignty.142  Attributed to 
Max Weber in general, monopoly of the legitimate use of force in a country has 
been traditionally a salient feature of a state from the domestic point of view.143  
Although used interchangeably, the terms country, nation, state and land can 
also be distinguished.  Whereas country is the geographical area, nation 
designates a group of people.  State refers to a governmental body and an entity 
in international law, and land refers to a country and its people.  According to the 





140 Mochizuki, 105. 
141 Takashi Inoguchi, “Japans Ambition for Normal Statehood,” in Jorge I. Dominguez and 
Byung-kook Kim, eds., Between Compliance And Conflict: East Asia, Latin America And The 
“New” Pax Americana, (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 2.   
142 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), 9. 
143 Max Weber, Politics as Vocation.  Full text of the article is available at 
http://socialpolicy.ucc.ie/Weber_Politics_as_Vocation.htm.  Max Weber was a German political 
economist and sociologist.  He gave a speech in 1918, which then became Politics as Vocation.  
The following is given as documentation on the web page: ‘Politik als Beruf,’ Gesammelte 
Politische Schriften (Muenchen, l921), 396-450.  Originally, a speech at Munich University, 1918, 
published in 1919 by Duncker & Humblodt, Munich.  From H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills 
(Translated and edited), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 77-128, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1946. 
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The state as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations 
with the other states.144  
With the aforementioned features and definitions, whether Japan 
completely qualifies for a normal state could be ascertained. 
As noted earlier, after the Second World War, which ended with the 
unconditional surrender of the Japanese Empire, the United States occupied 
Japan for approximately seven years.  Although the occupation ended in 1952, it 
was not until 1972 that Japan took control of all of its current territory.145  
However, the defense of Japan was never completely turned over to the 
Japanese military (Self-Defense Forces).  The United States continues to have 
bases in Japan as it does in many of its allied countries.  Japan's national 
defense policy has been based on maintaining the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security with the United States, under which Japan assumed 
unilateral responsibility for its own internal security.  Similar to the NATO 
agreement, the United States agreed to join in Japan's defense in the event that 
Japan or its territories were attacked, except that unlike the multilateral NATO 
agreement, this was a bilateral agreement.  Although the size and the capability 
of the Self-Defense Forces have always limited its role, until 1976, defense 
planning focused on developing forces adequate to deal with potential regional 
adversaries’ conventional capabilities.  In 1976, the Japanese government 
decided upon a policy that the Self-Defense Forces would be developed only to 
repel a small-scale, limited invasion,146 and that the Japanese nation would 
 
144 “The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,” Convention on Rights and Duties of States 
December 26, 1933, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/interam/intam03.htm, 
accessed on 14 September 2005. 
145 The United States agreed to return Okinawa in 1971, and it was officially returned to 
Japanese control in 1972, which marked the final date of occupation of Japanese territories by 
the United States.    
146 Although this may be the case in many small West European countries, given Japan’s 
size, population, economy, and history, this approach to defense policy becomes very abnormal, 
if not irrational.     
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depend on the United States to come to its aid in the event of a more serious 
incursion.147  The Japanese Basic Policy for Defense is described as: 
The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect 
aggression….  To achieve this objective, the government of Japan 
hereby establishes the following principles: … (4) To deal with 
external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security 
arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United 
Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.148               
On the other hand, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are strictly limited 
constitutionally.  Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution forever renounces the use 
of force as a means of settling international disputes.  It states that: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and 
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign 
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of 
settling international disputes.  In order to accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war 
potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the 
state will not be recognized. 149
The exact limitations of Article 9 constitute a controversial issue in Japan, 
but the Japanese government has interpreted it as allowing for Self-Defense 
Forces.  In spite of such an interpretation, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces 
have a limited overseas potential.  In addition, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces 
lack long range offensive capabilities and air-refueling and do not have marines 
or amphibious units, special forces, a large cache of ammunition, or rules of 
engagement.150
 
147 “Japan Defense Agency (Bôeichô) and Japan Self-Defense Forces,” GlobalSecuirty.Org, 
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jda.htm, accessed on 4 June 2005.   
148 “Basic Policy for Defense,” Japanese Self Defense Agency Homepage, available at 
http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm, accessed on 4 June 2005.   
149 “The Constitution of Japan,” Official Website of Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, 
available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html, 
accessed on 3 June 2005. 
150 Dolan and Worden, “Japan: A Country Study,” On-line book. 
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Even though Article 9 has greatly influenced foreign policy over the years, 
the Japanese government reinterpreted the “renouncing clause” as the use of 
force in international affairs, not renouncement of a national right to self-defense.  
This interpretation allowed for the creation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.  
In practice, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are very well equipped, and the 
Maritime Self-Defense Forces are widely considered to be stronger than the 
navies of Japan's neighbors.  In fact, with almost 240,000 military personnel and 
an annual budget of $50 billion, Japan's Self-Defense Forces exceed that of 
British military in total spending and manpower.  Its navy, in particular, scores 
high among experts for its capability.151   
Since the early 1990s, Article 9 has been the central feature of a dispute 
over the ability of Japan to undertake multilateral military commitments overseas.  
By 1990, Japan’s total defense expenditures were ranked third behind the then-
Soviet Union and the United States, and today it ranks second.152  The United 
States urged Japan to assume a larger share of the burden of defense of the 
western Pacific.  These conditions caused Article 9 to become increasingly 
irrelevant to Japan’s security situation.  However, Article 9 still acts as a serious 
hindrance against the growth of Japan's military capabilities.  Despite the fading 
of bitter wartime memories, according to opinion polls, a certain portion of the 
general public continued to show strong support for this constitutional 
provision.153
The majority of Japanese citizens approves of the spirit of Article 9, and 
considers it personally important; however, since the 1980s, there has been a 
shift away from a stance that would tolerate no alteration of the article to allow a 
 
151 “Japan Defense Agency (Bôeichô) and Japan Self-Defense Forces,” GlobalSecuirty.Org, 
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jda.htm, accessed on 4 June 2005.   
152 “Japan,” The World Factbook, CIA, available at 
http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ja.html, accessed on 4 June 2005. 
153 “Constitution experts oppose revision of Article 9,” available at http://www.japan-
press.co.jp/2383/kempo.html, accessed on 4 June 2005.  Also, see The Japan Times, “Article 9 
change signals desire to wage war,” available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040813f2.htm, accessed on 4 June 2005.   
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revision that would resolve the discord between the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces and Article 9.  Even though some scholars claim that Japanese citizens 
oppose revision of the constitution, recent opinion polls indicated that a majority 
of Japanese citizens are actually in favor of revision, yet modification of Article 9 
in particular still remains an uncertain issue.154
The debate, in simple terms, could be summarized as a debate over 
Japanese normalcy.  When viewed under the lens of the definition of a state, 
Japan lacks external sovereignty and complete monopoly on the legitimate use 
of force in its external affairs since Japanese defense decisions are dependent 
on United States defense policies.  The current cabinet led by Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi had hoped for a constitutional change by December 2005.155
C. JAPANESE POLICY OPTIONS ASSESSED 
Although some Japan scholars have in the past contemplated how Japan 
should normalize and why, the body of literature proposing solutions to Japan in 
regard to becoming a normal country remains limited.  In this section, 
assessment of some of the possible options will be presented.  The assessment 
will first explain what the options are, then posit the advantages of the various 
options followed by the disadvantages in political and economic terms.      
What are the main options that Japan could choose to follow?  There lie 
two possibilities ahead of Japan: “keep the status quo and do not normalize” or 
“normalize.”  This question, as a natural reaction, must be followed by the 
question, that if Japan were to normalize, then how far this normalization should 
 
154 Osamu Nishi, “Constitutional Revision: Present Situation and Future Challenges,” 
Foreign Press Center, Japan, available at http://www.fpcj.jp/e/mres/briefingreport/bfr_197.html, 
accessed on 4 June 2005.  Also, another opinion poll’s results available at 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/upi/?feed=TopNews&article=UPI-1-20050408-00304800-bc-japan-
constitution.xml, accessed on 4 June 2005, reveal that at least 61 percent of the Japanese 
citizens favor constitutional revision.  United Press International reported that this poll was 
conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper on 12 and 13 March 2005 at 250 different 
locations in Japan, and the questions were directed at 3,000 eligible voters, 1,795 of which 
provided valid responses.  
155 Ibid.  Also see, “Stop the Prime Minister’s Attacks on Constitutional Principles,” in Japan 
Press Weekly, On-line, available at http://www.japan-press.co.jp/2348/aug27.html, accessed on 
27 October 2005. 
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go.  There stand four options ahead of Japan in that sense.  First, Japan may 
choose to normalize by increasing the strength of the Self-Defense Forces to 
provide only for the defense of Japan.  Second, Japan could strengthen its 
military and make the necessary changes to its constitutional system to not only 
defend itself from foreign and domestic threats, but also help the United States in 
security matters around the world.  The third option for Japan is to become 
normal to the extent that it would fully eliminate its dependence on the United 
States and become a regional power ensuring not only its own security but its 
neighbors’ security as well.  The fourth option for Japan, although it sounds 
utopian, is to become a fully independent global power striving to ensure peace 
and stability around the world, which could also be depicted as a brand of 
“Japanese Wilsonianism.”156
1. Status Quo 
Keeping the status quo seems appealing to many Japanese for 
quintessentially, change implies spending time and effort to realize the expected 
outcomes.  As a result of our inert nature, we are unwilling to spend time and 
energy unless we most definitely have to.  Keeping the status quo benefits Japan 
from only this perspective.  That is, Japan will not permit extra military spending 
and will not receive antagonistic reactions from its neighbors, two of which can 
turn out to be extremely dangerous for Japan.  Many Asian countries, including 
 
156 The term “Wilsonianism” refers to legalistic internationalism, a vision of international order 
that is based on peace, democracy, and free trade.  The underlying principles were put forward in 
a fourteen-point program at the end of the First World War in 1918 by President Woodrow Wilson.  
The text of these fourteen points can be found at “President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points,” 
The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wilson14.htm.  Many books and articles were published about 
Wilsonianism.  For a larger definition, refer to Tamás Magyarics, Wisonianism: A Blueprint for 20th 
Century American Foreign Policy, available at 
http://www.coldwar.hu/html/en/publications/wilsonianism.html or David Steigerwald, Wilsonian 
Idealism in America, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
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China and the two Koreas, have bad memories of their past relations with the 
Japanese, and they are unwilling to see a normal Japan.157
On the other hand, the Japanese economy has gone into a serious 
recession, from which it has not yet fully recovered.  In fact, the Prime Minister of 
Japan, Junichiro Koizumi, in an effort to privatize the postal service and rescue 
the country from the economic downturn it has been experiencing, failed to get 
reforms enacted by the Diet.  Finally, he called for an election in September 2005 
hoping to achieve success.  The election results were a landslide victory for the 
Koizumi government158 since the Liberal Democratic Party won 296 seats in the 
480-seat House of Representatives, 84 more than it had going into the race.159  
The results of the election clearly indicate the desire of the Japanese voters for 
economic reforms as they expect the Prime Minister’s economic policies to help 
the country recover from its recession.  As a result of the aforementioned 
economic problems, Japan had to cut down its defense spending.  In fact, 
Japan’s defense spending was so confined by budgetary constraints that the 
defense budget for the year 2003 went down by 0.3 percent, a decrease of 
approximately 4 billion dollars.160  Thus, if Japan does not normalize and  
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strengthen its military accordingly, it will not have to spend any more than what it 
is currently spending.  However, it may turn out to be disadvantageous if 
scrutinized more carefully. 
First of all, if Japan keeps the status quo, it will not build a military 
industrial complex, from which it can benefit greatly.  This is because Japan is 
not an arms exporter and its military industrial infrastructure receives only a very 
small share of the total arms production revenue in the world.  It is no surprise to 
the world that the Japanese people have some of the most technologically 
advanced know-how and can emerge as a massive military equipment exporter 
that can challenge almost all of the countries making money from their military 
sales.  A second disadvantage springs from the potential problems that may 
arise in the future.  Japan is not ready to be abandoned by the United States, yet 
if the United States decides that it cannot commit an adequate force structure to 
provide for future Japanese defense, then Japan will come under serious danger 
as North Korea is openly, and China is covertly, hostile towards Japan.  In 
addition, Japan has received harsh criticism from the West and, in particular, 
from some Americans for not supporting the United States in its efforts to keep 
the world safe and stable.  Japan attempted to address the problem by 
committing a few troops to non-combat zones in Iraq, but when Japan’s 
economic might is considered, 950 troops dispatched to non-combat zones in 
Iraq is unreasonably disproportionate.  Without the necessary military might and 
without ridding Japan of its regional insecurities by fully being incorporated into 
the international system as a participatory country not just economically but also 
militarily, Japan’s chances of continuing its regional leadership with global 
significance and being accepted into the United Nations Security Council as a 
permanent member in order to have global influence on world affairs remain slim.    
2. Normalization 
Japan’s second alternative is to opt for normalization.  As stated earlier, 
this has been the trend in Japanese politics, and the issue of normalization has 
become a question of how far to normalize rather than whether to normalize.  
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The first question that arises is the danger that this might pose to the world in 
general; however, suspicion of Japanese motives are almost completely 
unfounded.  Although Japan has been seeking a greater role in international 
institutions, most notably in the United Nations Security Council, it has resisted a 
more dramatic redefinition of its security role within the wider Western order, 
which is a clear indication that the status of Japan in the Western security system 
is stable and that Japan is not pursuing great-power ambitions and 
capabilities.161  According to Samuel Huntington, Japanese political culture has 
significantly changed after 1945 and became liberal and antimilitaristic.162  In this 
sense, Japanese normalization does not pose any significant threat to the region 
or to the world at large. 
a. First Normalization Option 
Once determined to strengthen its military to don the mask of 
normalcy, Japan can choose one out of four options, the first of which is to 
become a state fully capable of defending itself but unwilling to partake in peace 
operations around the world and unenthusiastic about contributing to world 
peace and stability.  This option would not only worsen the current aberrant 
nature of Japanese foreign policy, but would also antagonize its neighbors and 
strong members of the international community, which in turn could become very 
unsafe and destructive for Japan.  China and the two Koreas challenge Japan 
because of their past experiences, and North Korea and China pose significant 
military threats as they both see Japan as a regional hegemon that has the 
potential to turn into a destructive military machine best exemplified by Japan’s 
behavior prior to 1945.163  Strategically, this option may transcend the status quo 
option in its potentially damaging nature.   
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Economically, Japan would not benefit from assuming full 
responsibility for its own defense.  First of all, by taking on full responsibility for its 
own defense, it will end up spending much of its accumulated capital on 
strengthening its military to confront any potential military attack.  Secondly, as a 
result of becoming an aggressor state, it will not find a profitable market for its 
arms sales, and thus will not enjoy the benefits of building a military industrial 
complex.  Lastly, in such a case, Japan will feel obligated to become a nuclear 
state since all of its immediate neighbors except South Korea possess nuclear 
weapons.  Without the support of the United States, this could not only turn out to 
be extremely costly, but may lead Japan into an arms race with its neighboring 
countries—mainly China and North Korea, but not Russia.  Such an arms race 
with China and North Korea has the potential of fatally damaging the already-
stricken Japanese economy as it similarly devastated the Soviet Union 
economically and left it in pieces at the end of the Cold War.  Besides, a Japan 
that takes sole responsibility for its own defense will lead to a more antagonistic 
China and Russia, who in the current state of affairs, adamantly refuse Japanese 
accession to the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member.  
Since developing into a “normal” country concentrating on its own defense 
appears not to be advantageous, Japan should consider other forms of normal 
statehood. 
b. Second Normalization Option 
As mentioned earlier, Japan can choose to build up its military and 
reform its constitutional system to not only defend itself from external and internal 
threats, but also help the United States and its coalition partners in security 
matters around the world.  By doing so, Japan will have more advantages and 
will reinforce its ties not only with the developed countries of the West, but also 
with other less developed and developing countries around the world.  Although 
this option may have some disadvantages, it will have positive economic and 
political impacts on Japan. 
  58
                                           
Japanese post-Cold War political goals, particularly following the 
strong leadership of Junichiro Koizumi, have moved towards a more influential 
role in world affairs.  This not only benefited Japan, but also was welcomed by 
the United States and its coalition partners.  The Bush administration has always 
been determined to work closely with its key Asian ally just as the previous 
Clinton administration had.164  It would be unjust to review the recent U.S-Japan 
relations without mentioning Richard Armitage’s name.  He had a profound 
influence on the U.S. policy towards Asia and was the leader in formulating the 
administration’s approach to Asia in general, and Japan in particular.165  The 
Armitage-Nye report published in 2000 strongly supported a “normal” Japan with 
a strong alliance with the United States.  The then-Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage stated that Japan could count on the United States, and the 
United States could count on Japan as well, and added that he believed the 
Japanese should remove all obstacles preventing them from participating in 
collective self-defense.166  The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance 
ensured Japan’s security in the region.  The United States made its expectation 
very clear to Japanese politicians about Japan’s active role in military affairs.  For 
a healthy and robust security alliance, Japan must move forward with 
normalization. 
On the other hand, as the Cold War threat diminished completely, 
the world moved away from its bipolar nature, and multilateral security 
arrangements became more important and necessary, especially after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  As the United States took upon the task 
of building a democratic state in Iraq and made the global war on terrorism its 
number one priority, a massive multilateral cooperation campaign against 
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transnational terrorism all around the world began.  Japan, although contributing 
economically, has not made many military contributions to this multilateral 
endeavor.  One can claim that the 950 troops sent to Iraq are “boots on the 
ground,” but Japan made it very clear that it would only deploy its Self-Defense 
Forces in non-combat zones.  Among these pacifist approaches to global 
security, Japan has been strongly advocating United Nations Security Council 
reforms. 
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs openly declared that a 
permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council was one of Japan’s major 
foreign policy goals.  Strongly opposed by China and Russia, a permanent seat 
in the Security Council is quite unlikely for Japan unless the country has the 
assertive nature, the crucial military capabilities, and the strategic importance for 
the position.  In the Diplomatic Bluebook 2004 published by the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is stated that Japan’s foreign policy aims at securing 
the safety and prosperity of Japan and the Japanese people, and to that end, it is 
essential that peace, stability, and prosperity be realized in the international 
community.167  As part of securing these goals, Japan aspires to and actively 
seeks a permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council.  It is 
explicitly stated in the bluebook that “Japan intends to build an ideal, concrete 
vision of the United Nations Security Council for the future, vigorously working to 
realize its reform, and to achieve permanent membership in the Security 
Council.” 168
If Japan is to be supported by the West—particularly by the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France—for its permanent accession to the UN 
Security Council, then it would be natural for the United States to raise the bar of 
expectations from Japan, insisting on active participation in peacekeeping 
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operations.169  Only if Japan is willing to become a “normal,” participatory, 
military power, could the Japanese expect to have more influence on world 
affairs and continue to be the most significant key ally in Northeast Asia, along 
with a continued regional leadership role with global significance.  Such 
influential power may very well affect the Japanese economy in a positive 
direction as well. 
By becoming a normal country with a significant military power, 
Japan must develop a strong military-industrial complex of its own that can 
significantly contribute to the Japanese economy.  Japan already has a massive 
military industry; however, a Defense News recent report on the top 100 Defense 
Contractors indicates that the most active defense company in Japan with the 
highest defense-related revenue is Kawasaki Heavy Industries.  Kawasaki ranks 
fortieth among the top 100 defense contractors.  The entire Japanese military 
industry combined does not even add up to the revenue of the fifteenth largest 
US defense contractor—Computer Sciences Corp.170  Although there are 
initiatives in Japan for strengthening the defense industry, without normalizing, it 
seems to get tackled constantly by legal barriers because, as a nation dedicated 
to peace, Japan does not export arms.  Reviewing Japanese legislation reveals 
that Japan not only has strict laws regulating the manufacture, possession, and 
transfer of arms, but also proscribes the export of arms—hunting guns and sport 
guns are excluded.171
Strengthening the defense industry will not only benefit the 
Japanese economy but also Japanese security.  For instance, in December 
2004, Japan announced that it was committed to work with the United States on 
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developing anti-missile defense technology, which was, and still is, aimed at the 
threat from China.  On the other hand, the Koizumi government has moved 
forward with assertive policies in recent months taking sides on sensitive issues 
such as Taiwan.  Prime Minister Koizumi has also paid visits to countries such as 
the Philippines, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, and France, and lobbied for a 
permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council—all of which were 
criticized adamantly by China and Russia.  Japan has also decided to invest in 
ITER,172 a massive new research project designed to generate electricity from 
the sort of nuclear fusion that powers the sun.  This indicates that Japan is 
inclined to make significant changes to its foreign policy and security strategy, 
becoming more activist than pacifist.173  With the wealth of industrial, technical, 
and scientific expertise which Japan commands, if it were to become more active 
in defense, Japan could quickly become one of the top earners of international 
defense industry revenues.  Along with the defense industry, another economic 
aspect of normalization becomes apparent: energy security.  
An important issue for Japan is energy security.  The Japanese 
government has worked diligently to diversify its energy sources and to secure 
supplies abroad.  Although successful to an extent, Japan remains vulnerable to 
global oil and gas disruptions, and energy security stands as a key element of 
the national security agenda.  The main problem springs from Japan’s need for 
oil.  Despite the decrease in Japanese oil demands, which is roughly less than 50 
percent of its total energy use,174 Japan depends on Persian oil supplies for 80 
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percent of its total oil needs, which in turn makes the country very vulnerable to 
global oil disruptions.175  Another factor is that Japan’s oil company Japan 
National Oil Corporation (JNOC) has produced disappointing results in its efforts 
to gain control of overseas oil supplies.  Japan literally wasted 40 billion dollars 
on JNOC that met with almost no success.176
Recent Japanese developments in oil security, however, are 
promising as Japan, under serious opposition from the United States, completed 
a long-debated deal with Iran to get exclusive development rights for the 
Azadegan oil field.177  In addition, Japan is working with Russia to build a 
pipeline through Siberia to bring untapped Siberian oil to the Pacific coast at 
Nakhodka.178  Although there were rumors that Russia, after the seven billion 
dollar offer to finance the construction of this pipeline, contracted Japan to build 
it, so far, Russia has refused to commit to which customer would get deliveries 
and when. Recently, however, Russian president Vladimir Putin has confirmed 
that a multibillion-dollar oil pipeline to be built across Siberia will first go to China 
and only later to the Pacific coast.179
Another important issue of Japanese energy security is its vast 
imports of natural gas from Southeast Asia, mainly from the Aceh province of 
Indonesia.  Given that 80 percent of maritime piracy occurs in this region, along 
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with the volatile security measures in the region, especially after September 11, 
Japan’s share of energy consumption from Indonesian natural gas accounts for 
some 70 percent.  Japan could face serious danger if threats are made to that 
supply during its transportation.180  In such unpredictable circumstances, Japan’s 
normalization and the need for constitutional revision became necessary, as 
none of the above security needs would be directly provided by the United States 
Security Alliance.    
For all of the aforementioned benefits to be obtained by Japan, 
normalization may be inevitable.  The course of Japan’s military policy is toward 
becoming a “normal” military power, and it is obvious that certain Japanese and 
American policymaking communities are eagerly supporting Japan to assume 
such a role in world affairs by ending its ban on collective security and fully 
partaking in multilateral coalitions in East Asia and elsewhere.181  However, 
Japan has two other options for normalcy.        
c. Third Normalization Option 
A third option for Japan is to become normal to the extent that it 
would become independent of the United States and become a regional power 
ensuring not only its own security but its neighbors’ security as well.  However, 
the already suspicious Chinese and Koreans, as well as Southeast Asians, will 
ask whether this is a new attempt for or a different form of Japanese imperialism, 
or the revival thereof.  In fact, two recent developments appear relevant to Sino-
Japanese relations in the wake of Japanese normalization.  First, Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s strong support for U.S. policy in Iraq and his unprecedented dispatch 
of troops and equipment has undoubtedly strengthened long-standing Chinese 
concerns over increased Japanese military power and Japan’s budding interest 
to undertake military responsibilities beyond the archipelago.  Second, the post-
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September 11 developments—namely, improvement in U.S-China relations and 
intense U.S focus on combating terrorism—have arguably lessened the U.S.-
Japan security alliance’s advancement in Asia, thus creating a potential reduction 
in Sino-Japanese tensions and increasing the opportunity for the emergence of a 
more cooperative environment between Japan and China.  This situation may 
actually prove that the time has become ripe for Japan to change its constitution 
and strengthen its military to partake in peace operations around the globe.182  
However, in essence, the region does not appear ready to accept Japanese help 
in defense matters.  Many Asian countries, including China and the two Koreas, 
have bad memories of their past relations with the Japanese, and they would be 
more willing to see a “normal” Japan, which is ready to “face the dark side of its 
past.”183  By attempting to increase direct influence on its immediate neighbors, 
Japan would most probably exacerbate the situation and fail in its attempt to 
become a strong regional power. 
On the other hand, Japan’s foreign policy trajectory is not directed 
towards becoming a regional superpower, thus this option is also very unlikely to 
take place.  The long-standing economic disputes between Japan and the United 
States have not taken a more serious turn.  The United States has continually 
insisted that Japan open its markets and economic practices, and Japan has not 
responded with increased intransigence but has chosen to take steps toward 
openness and deregulation.  Initially, the post-Cold War domestic realignment184 
in Japan caused frustration in the West lest Japan strongly commit to mercantilist 
policies.  Even though Japan followed protectionist economic policies for 
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decades, the Japanese prime minister’s 1999 reaffirmation of a commitment to 
deregulation and greater openness and the primacy of the security treaty with the 
United States, however, eliminated such suspicions and fears.185  Although John 
Mearsheimer claims that Japan is showing signs of independent behavior as 
there remains a lack of a galvanizing threat, Japan and the United States 
reaffirmed their commitment to the security treaty, which leaves no room for 
suspicion.  For example, even though President Clinton’s 9-day visit to China for 
the purpose of improving Sino-U.S. relations may have been interpreted as a 
sign for weakening of the Japan-U.S. relationship, the Japanese Diet’s 1999 
legislation for further expansion of partnership with the United States proved the 
exact opposite, which invalidates pointless suspicions about the alliance’s 
future.186
In 2001, Mearsheimer predicted that Japan is not likely to remain a 
ward of the United States and is likely to establish itself as a great power, yet 
recent developments such as Japanese involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq 
reiterates that Japan will continue to be a crucial and loyal ally of the United 
States regardless of establishing itself as a normal country.187  The political-
military partnership and cooperation with Japan has increased significantly during 
the Bush administration.  Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and his government 
have a successful track record of being loyal strategic partners even though 
there remain constraints arising from Japanese economic difficulties and political 
differences.  Japanese support in the war on terrorism is unmatched in Northeast 
Asia.  Koizumi outspokenly supported the U.S.-led attack on Iraq and was eager 
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meeting with Kim Jong Il in September 2002 for overlooking U.S. interests, the 
Japanese Prime Minister meticulously coordinated his 2004 visit to Pyongyang 
with the United States.188
Moreover, realists interpreted that Japanese nationalists are 
victorious for three reasons.  First, Japan has the second largest defense budget 
in the world.  Second, it is developing its own spy satellites against the wishes of 
the United States.  Third, it has established commissions in the Diet to review its 
pacifist constitution.  Realist interpretations that Japan is pursuing an 
independent policy constitute nothing but prejudice as they ignore Japan’s 
actions, which display its intention to assist the West at large and the United 
States in particular in promoting global peace and stability.189  On the other hand, 
the future growth of China will continue to raise concerns in Japan, which will 
lead the Japanese to even closer strategic cooperation with the West, particularly 
the United States.  Thus, fears that Japan may throw its weight to the Chinese 
and strike an accord with them by breaking its alliance with the United States 
appear quite unfounded as well.190
Although the likelihood of Japan attempting to grow into a regional 
hegemon is still there, without a gradual normalization process, this would be a 
step too-long that would in the short and long run severely hurt Japanese 
interests.  This option could optimistically be operationalized within two decades 
if Japan begins to normalize in the next couple of years.  Japan first has to prove 
itself to have good intentions toward the region, and then and only then, can it 
help its neighbors.  Otherwise, its neighbors would neither be enthusiastic nor 
prepared to receive help from Japan.  In addition, it will draw serious criticism 
and maybe threats from some of its neighbors. 
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d. Fourth Normalization Option 
Along the lines of the previous option, the world is not ready to see 
Japan as another superpower running security business around the world.  
Japan does not even have a permanent seat in United Nations Security Council, 
so the fourth option of a Japanese brand of Wilsonianism would spread Japan 
too thin.  Russett and Oneal posit that Japan, having experienced catastrophic 
and debilitating costs after the Second World War for following realpolitik 
principles, now largely follows liberal policies.191  According to Russett and 
Oneal, Japan suffered in the past and thus has absorbed painful lessons to build 
a Kantian system of perpetual peace.  The authors believe that the Japanese 
would never attempt to stage similar imperialistic ambitions that took place during 
or before the Second World War regardless of their trade disagreements with 
other countries.192  This has proved to be the case for Japan for over 60 years.  
Thus, Japanese Wilsonianism is a farfetched policy option.  Japan could take 
such an action half a century from now, and one can never predict in detail what 
may happen so far in the future.  For instance, in 1950, nobody could have 
foreseen the end of the Cold War that was to happen two score years later.  
Thus, such an option is neither likely nor wise to plan for even in the long run.  
After assessing all these options, there seems to be only one rational choice for 
Japan.               
D. THE BEST OPTION 
What is the reasonable option for Japan?  Upfront, the most reasonable 
option for Japan appears to be the second normalization option, which prescribes 
strengthening its military not only to provide for its own defense but also to help 
the United States in security matters around the world.  This would bring mutual 
benefits to both Japan and the United States.  Besides, it would be valuable for 
the West to see Japan help the United States in security matters.  In addition, 
Japan has proved to be better at operating with the United States than on its 
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own.  According to Chalmers Johnson, states G. John Ikenberry, Japan finds 
itself better able to operate in formal bilateral relations whereas the United States 
proved to be more organized than Japan in its far-flung multilateral relations.  As 
a result of such historical tendencies and internal organizational characteristics, 
the incentives of Japan and the United States to create and operate within 
multilateral organizations differ.193  The U.S.-Japan security alliance has gone 
through a renewal process in the 1990s.  The two nations saw a great benefit in 
reaffirming their security partnership and developed more sophisticated forms of 
military cooperation, contingency planning, and burden sharing.  Fifteen years 
after the Cold War, the bilateral U.S.-Japanese alliance seems to be as strong as 
it was—if not more than before.  This indicates that the alliance remains strong 
despite the end of the Cold War or the rise and the fall of a specific regional or 
global security threat.  Many Japanese see the security relationship with the U.S. 
as a way to render the bilateral ties more stable by binding each to the other.194
Mearsheimer argues that Japan, although a potential hegemon in its 
region, will never become a threat to either Northeast Asia or the world at large.  
He maintains that Japan has a relatively small population and is an insular state 
with significant barriers against power-projection.  He believes that it is unlikely 
that Japan could carry out an attack on mainland Asia, and it is unlikely that 
Japan will shake loose from the United States and become a great power in its 
region as it would terrify China, the two Koreas, and Russia.  These formidable 
adversaries would become determined to use their militaries against any 
Japanese attack on mainland Asia.  In this worst case scenario, Japanese 
normalcy would not make war more or less likely, but rather would lead to a 
balanced Asia even if the United States exited the region.195  Also, strengthening 
Japan’s cooperation with Southeast Asia has been a priority of Prime Minister 
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Koizumi since his May 2002 address on “The Future of Asia.”  While Washington 
continues to emphasize bilateral relations both in economics and for the war on 
terrorism, Tokyo desires to be a core participant in the region’s transformation, 
which indicates that the region is ready to see a supportive Japan.196
Analyzed from the economic and political perspectives and synthesized in 
the light of Japanese national interests, normal statehood seems an inevitable 
consequence of Japan’s increasing role in world affairs.  It is almost tempting to 
state that Japan has even been late in becoming a “normal” military power 
partaking in the United States’ coalition in ensuring peace and stability around 
the world while assisting developing and underdeveloped countries to become 
affable actors of the international arena.         
E. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BEST OPTION AS THE NEW JAPANESE 
FOREIGN POLICY 
While Japan continues to deal with challenges both at home and abroad, 
and yet prospects for sustainable economic growth remain uncertain, in order to 
operationalize the most reasonable option for normalization, Japan should 
ensure that at least three important tasks are conducted.  The first one stands 
out as the most important: constitutional revision.  In the current political scene, 
with both the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Japan 
supporting a constitutional amendment including the revision of Article 9, and the 
Social Democratic Party and the Japanese Communist Party permanently 
weakened, the debate on a constitutional amendment has entered a new phase: 
the issue is now how the constitution is to be revised.  Although some claim that 
a revised constitution will essentially be a reworded version of the present 
constitution except for the recognition of the existence of the Self-Defense 
Forces, Japan, in order to normalize, must act wisely to avoid such word games.  
On the other hand, some polls have shown that about 70-80 percent of the public 
says that the war-renouncing Article 9 should not be amended.  Conclusions that 
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the public is apparently not interested in a general revision of the constitution are 
unfounded because when asked by pollsters and pushed for an answer, opinion 
is about evenly split, for and against revision, which has been the pattern for 
decades.  At times, most Japanese polled simply did not know what to make of 
the constitution.  In other words, it has not functioned as the source of national 
unity and loyalty.197  Even though many polls would result in a lack of public 
support for constitutional change, particularly revision of Article 9, the politicians 
are inclined towards revision.  One example of how public opinion can differ from 
policy and be successful was the sending of troops to Iraq, which 80 percent of 
the population did not support, yet Koizumi pushed for it and ordered Japanese 
troops dispatched to Iraq to a non-combat zone.  In a similar fashion, 
constitutional revision is likely to happen soon as well.198
While both the Social Democratic Party and the Japan Communist Party 
are opposed to changing the Constitution (Article 9, in particular, which 
renounces war), the Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition party, is in 
favor of pushing ahead with revising the Constitution—including revisions to the 
controversial issues relating to the deployment of the country's Self-Defense 
Forces as well as Japanese participation in collective self-defense.  Changing the 
Constitution so that Japan can take part in collective defense may be the price 
Japan must pay to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security 
Council.199
The second important task Japan must deal with is to make the necessary 
adjustments to its budget.  It is not as easy and as economical to have a military 
capable of conducting operations around the world.  Japan definitely does have 
the resources to successfully partake in such endeavors; however, a detailed 
plan on how to appropriate those resources and, in fact, how further to increase 
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the already-allocated defense budget must be meticulously crafted by Japanese 
budget analysts and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.     
The third important task to be conducted by Japan is to ensure a smooth 
transition from its current operations to a state of normalcy.  Depending on the 
definition of normalization, one can claim that Japan has been normalizing since 
the early 1980s and has built upon this trend of military strengthening.  In 
particular, Prime Minister Koizumi has played a key role in accelerating and 
further developing this form of normalization—characterized by shifting away 
from Japan’s stridently anti-military pacifist culture—after the September 11 
terrorist attacks.200  This trend has worked to Japan’s advantage, yet there 
remains no need for Japan or its politicians to strike a chord about the past 
enmities with its Asian neighbors.  In this sense, it would be a wise idea for 
Koizumi, for instance, to not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, and for Diet members like 
Masahiro Morioka to avoid making such farfetched and mind-boggling claims that 
the Tokyo Tribunal was a show trial where such notions as crime against peace 
and humanity were arbitrarily made by the Allied Powers.201  This would only 
work to exasperate Japan’s neighbors and exacerbate the situation, which would 
then frustrate and delay the normalization process if not fully impede it.   
F. CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that with the policies of its reformist premier, a new Japan is 
emerging.  Although more nationalistic and more assertive than before, the basic 
Japanese strategic calculus has remarkably remained the same as before, 
continuing the post-World War II legacy of anti-militarism.  Japan pursues a 
comprehensive strategy of integrating its security and economic interests.  The 
alliance with the United States serves as the foundation of Japanese physical 
security.  Although Mochizuki claims that there is little reason for Japan to adopt 
a military posture or doctrine independent of or less reliant on the United 
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States,202 and Japanese defense policy continues to adamantly avoid partaking 
directly in combat operations overseas with or without the United States, the 
reformist Koizumi government has been working to implement such changes 
while continuing to strengthen the alliance with the United States.  Recent 
political and domestic developments have encouraged speculation that Japan is 
using the military to assume a higher international profile, and Japan has a right 
to play such a military role as long as it does not breach its own legal and 
constitutional constraints.203  The Japanese have always understood that even 
though the U.S. alliance was essential, it did not suffice to make Japan more 
secure and prosperous.204
If the constitution were amended to permit Japan to exercise the right of 
collective self-defense, such a transformation would reflect a major change in 
national identity, and therefore, would lead to a significant change in its national 
security strategy.  Although such a change would alter the Japanese political 
posture in the global scene, Japan could and most probably should remain 
closely allied to the United States even after such a monumental change.  Some 
political scientists would suggest that Japan could become an ally more akin to 
Britain actively participating in overseas missions together with the United 
States.205  Although the concept of normalcy has taken a place in Japan’s 
defense agenda, the definition of a normal country has remained vague.  In this 
context, scholars have reflected upon different types of normalcy that Japan 
potentially can follow including the examples of the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany; however, what constitutes the standards for Japanese normalization 
have yet to be fully explored and agreed upon.  Takashi Inoguchi makes a similar 
argument and recommends the British example as more appropriate since 
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France and Germany do not share similarities with Japan in relation to the United 
States.206  Along similar lines, the Armitage-Nye Report of October 2000, 
prepared by a group of U.S. foreign policy experts co-chaired by former Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Lee Armitage, argued that the goal of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance should be the special relationship similar to that of the United States and 
Britain.207   
On the other hand, Mike Mochizuki claims that neither the French nor the 
British model is suitable for Japan.  He contends that the British model is a step 
too far for Japan as it would not only become a strong military partner but also an 
important regional military power that can threaten its neighbors.  As for the 
French model, a Gaullist alternative is unlikely as it requires a considerable 
degree of autonomy and the emergence of Japan as a serious nuclear power.  
He claims that the German model is far more befitting as the Japanese 
international outlook and behavior continues to be shaped by Japan’s militarist 
past.  He contends that it is wise for Japan to continue a strong alliance with the 
United States while cultivating an environment in the Asia-Pacific region 
hospitable for Japan’s long term economic and security interests.208
It is important for Japan to search for role models and learn lessons from 
its friends in the West; however, it is more important that Japan acts as itself.  As 
a result of such a search for a role model, a definitional problem of what 
constitutes normalcy may arise.  Such semantic arguments are irrelevant for the 
normalization of Japan because what constitutes a “not normal” state seems to 
be obvious, and almost all scholars would concur that Japan is “not normal.”  
Thus, Japan should evaluate itself with its own capabilities and in accordance 
with its own geopolitical and geostrategic importance.  Japan can only afford to 
continue its alliance with the United States, and it would benefit from normal 
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statehood in security-related and economic interests along with establishing a 
firm regional leadership with an increasing global significance. 
  75
                                           
V. IMPACTS OF JAPANESE NORMALIZATION 
This chapter analyzes Japanese political change in the post-Cold War era 
by assessing the impacts of a normal Japan.  As a corollary to the main 
argument of this thesis, this chapter argues that Japanese normalization will 
have mixed impacts, and Japan must act cautiously to pursue its national 
interests, especially toward China.  The impacts of a normal Japan can be best 
categorized under three views.  These are welcoming reactions, adamant 
opposition, and indifference.  The West—the United States in particular—will 
welcome a normal Japan.  Northeast Asia—namely China and the two Koreas—
and Southeast Asia are unwilling to see a normal Japan and remain wary and 
hesitant at best.  Russia, South Asia, and the rest of the world in general are 
rather indifferent to a normal Japan with differing approaches from time to time.  
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi took office in April 2001 and has 
insisted on expanding the Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ mission, first by 
approving deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in the Indian 
Ocean, and later on with the domestically unpopular decision to deploy the 
Ground Self-Defense Forces to Samawah, Iraq.209  Recently, on 10 December 
2004, the Koizumi administration published an update to the 1996 National 
Defense Program Outline and accompanying Mid-Term Defense Forces 
Reorganization Plan.210  This plan has increased the speed of the Japanese 
Self-Defense Forces’ shift away from being only a self-defense force capable of 
operating with the United States in defense of Japan to that of a globally 
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recognized force proficient to conduct a wide spectrum of operations in unstable 
geopolitical environments throughout the globe.  While there remains a long legal 
and doctrinal way to go for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces before Japan can 
operate as a “normal” country, Japan’s increased military participation in world 
affairs has triggered suspicions among regional neighbors, whose assessments 
are often quite different from those of the United States or Japan.  Should Japan 
become a normal country, China, the two Koreas, and the Southeast Asian 
countries may interpret such transformation as a comeback of Japanese 
militarism and perceive Japan as a threat.  This chapter will now assess the 
Japanese national interests and the global impacts of a normal Japan.  
A. JAPAN’S NATIONAL INTERESTS 
Japan's national interests obviously lay in its security and continued 
prosperity while also engaging the world diplomatically, economically, and 
militarily.  Japan’s primary national interest is to ensure its safety, security, and 
prosperity while promoting a peaceful society.  In light of this, Japan views its 
territory, its surrounding region, the Persian Gulf resource area, and the Sea 
Lines of Communication from the Persian Gulf to Japan as its main security 
interests.  Since the end of the Cold War, China and North Korea have become 
significant threats to Japan.  Additionally, piracy in Southeast Asia and the 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea have increased.  In this context, Japan 
needs an even stronger alliance with the United States than ever before.211
B. U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS 
The United States-Japanese security alliance has been constantly 
evolving since its inception following the Second World War.  Both the United 
States and Japan face an increasingly complex international scene, and must 
rely on strong allies to achieve national security.  Although the relationship 
between Tokyo and Washington has sometimes been bumpy, its historical route 
is directed to increasing ties between the two nations.  Incontestably, decision 
makers in both countries have agreed that the current bilateral alliance stands 
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essential to their respective security interests.212  Shared interests and threats 
have pushed Japan and the United States to tighten their alliance, and the two 
nations will continue to grow in their interdependence.  The United States has 
openly expressed its intentions to see a normal Japan.  Even though some 
policymakers and political scientists remain wary of a strong, militarily capable 
Japan, the actual United States policy has been welcoming of a “normal” Japan. 
The Japanese-American alliance has its roots in the American occupation 
of Japan following World War II.  Unwilling to permit any hint of militarism, the 
United States specifically aimed to cultivate a national culture of anti-militarism, 
which was eagerly adopted by the war-weary Japanese population.  This had the 
effect of prohibiting the establishment of a Japanese military and making the 
United States responsible for Japan’s security in the early stages of the cold war.  
In the post-Cold War era, Japanese anti-militarism came to be criticized, 
however.213  
In late 2004, the most recent revisions of the National Defense Guidelines 
and the Japanese Military Assessment were published.  These documents 
favored a strengthened alliance with the United States, specifically named both 
North Korea and China as threats for the first time, and suggested constitutional 
revision to Article 9.214  Although there have been indications, Japan has yet to 
formally discuss constitutional reform.  As a result of the recent trends in U.S.-
Japan relations, speculating about the growth of Japanese military contributions 
to the alliance would not be farfetched. 
In addition to the American encouragement, Japan has another motive in 
moving towards normality.  The prospect of a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council would provide Japan an international voice 
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proportionate to its economic influence.  Japan has historically been highly 
involved with the United Nations, but has relied upon the United States for its 
security.  Japan contributes nearly 20% of the U.N.’s budget, significantly more 
than any other nation except the United States.215  Both Washington and Tokyo 
would like to see Japan possess a more influential voice in the United Nations. 
Washington welcomes Tokyo’s moves towards normalizing its defense 
capabilities and assuming a more prominent role in the bilateral alliance.  The 
United States has found itself embroiled in the global war on terror, and is always 
eager for contributors to its “coalition of the willing.”  As previously noted, Japan 
has most recently contributed logistical support to Operation Enduring Freedom 
in Afghanistan and has also assumed a prominent role in reconstruction.  In 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Japan currently has 550 ground SDF soldiers in Iraq to 
assist in reconstruction efforts.  Their deployment marks the first time since 1945 
that Japanese soldiers have entered a war zone.  Washington views the prospect 
of constitutional reform and Japanese defense normality as desirable and 
positive, sharing the feeling of the majority of Japanese policy makers and the 
Japanese population.  Historically, the United States has been careful not to be 
seen as the catalyst for Japanese political reform.  Despite Washington’s lack of 
enthusiasm to become involved in Japanese domestic politics, the Bush 
administration has recently called for changes to Article 9, and the then-
Secretary of State Colin Powell said that Japan must revise Article 9 if it wants to 
gain membership on the United Nations Security Council.216
C. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 
China perceives any Japanese military advance as a threat to its security, 
yet Japan remains crucial in a continued Chinese economic development.  China 
will most likely continue to veto Japanese application for permanent membership 
in the United Nations Security Council if Japan becomes a normal country, and 
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even worse, a conflict may break out between Japan and China if the tensions 
escalate.  Despite these possibilities, China, in the current state of affairs, cannot 
afford a hot war or a severe economic confrontation against Japan provided that 
it wishes to continue its economic development. 
Japan named China a threat in its 2004 military assessment.  Because of 
China’s significant impact on Northeast Asian security, its continued 
enhancement of nuclear and missile capabilities, and vigorous efforts of 
modernization of its navy and air force while expanding marine activities, Japan 
sees a need to continue to watch Chinese moves in the future.217  There have 
been enormous Chinese efforts to modernize the People’s Liberation Army, and 
in that context, China has acquired Russian made nuclear submarines, surface 
destroyers, and other conventional armaments.218  These improvements in the 
Chinese armed forces have alarmed many Japanese leaders who distrust many 
of Beijing’s motives.  While North Korea exhibits the most overt hostility against 
Japan, China is potentially a far more dangerous enemy with its vastly superior 
armed forces and its massive economy.  Recent diplomatic bickering over 
historical issues has not improved relations between the two nations, even 
though they remain heavily involved as trading partners. 
China and Japan celebrated the 30th anniversary of their normalization in 
2002.  The relations between China and Japan continue to grow stronger, 
especially economically.  China has surpassed the United States as the number 
one exporter to Japan, and Japan is China's largest trading partner.219  As the 
economies of China and Japan become more interdependent, the importance of 
the security of the sea-lanes and keeping goods and services flowing will 
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increase in Northeast Asia as well.  Despite the growing economic interaction, 
there are still issues from the past that affect present day relations. 
China represents the greatest competition economically, militarily, and 
politically to Japan.  While Japan remains the greatest economic power in Asia, 
China has had a larger percentage of GDP growth over the past several years 
and shows no signs of slowing down.  China has also become the world's top 
recipient of foreign direct investment.  Militarily, China has the largest standing 
army at just over two million troops and continues to modernize its military.  
China’s military spending in 2004 increased 11.6 percent over the 2003 budget of 
185.3 billion yuan (22.37 billion dollars).220
As China continues to grow economically and modernize militarily, it has 
the potential to become the regional hegemon and potentially become the next 
superpower to compete with the United States.  Thus, China would not welcome 
a fully "normalized" Japan.  Japan would present greater competition as a 
"normalized" country with the ability to project power.  Furthermore, it would be 
most beneficial for China if Japan stayed under the United States’ security lid.  
China could then focus on the United States as its major competitor knowing that 
Japan is under control.  On the other hand, a normalized Japan could be used as 
a balance by China against the United States, a remote possibility which some 
U.S. policymakers fear from.   
While Japan and China are close neighbors, they have disputes over a 
number of issues.  Despite these issues, Tokyo desires to eliminate Beijing’s 
skepticism about the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance.  China has numerous 
concerns over the recently revised Japanese Defense Guidelines.  In addition, 
Chinese leaders who watch Japan closely believe that Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces have transformed greatly and, with the support of the United States, will 
play a much stronger role in the coming future.  The Chinese are afraid that the 
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United States does not plan to keep Japan in check militarily, which in turn, may 
result in Japan engaging in collective self-defense. 
The future of relations between China and Japan continues to be one of 
the major focal points of discussion in East Asia.  Chinese leaders have been 
cautious of a remilitarized Japan since its defeat in the Second World War.  
China is primarily opposed to Japan’s nationalistic moves.  China is also 
opposed to the expansion of Japan’s military mission in a global environment.  
This is primarily due to the concern that global ambitions will lead to a militarist 
Japan’s resurgence.  For the predictable future, the greatest obstacle to 
improved security relations between Beijing and Tokyo will be the resolution of 
historical issues.  Solving these problems is not something that Japan can do 
alone.  Japan must have a greater understanding of how deep the historical 
issues run in China.  Beijing, for its part, must be ready to abandon its use of 
historical issues as a foreign policy tool and work with Japan to truly resolve the 
issues.  Fears of reemergence of a militarist Japan similar to that which affected 
all of Asia in the first half of the twentieth century will keep Chinese planners 
nervously observing Japanese improvements in the near term. 
D. KOREAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 
Both Koreas are suspicious of a militarily strong Japan; however, 
reactions of a unified Korea—an important political and geographic change that 
may take years to happen—is unknown at this stage.  Although allied through 
their respective alliances with the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK or 
South Korea) and Japan are still politically confrontational.  South Korea’s 
historical antagonism and threat perception of the Japanese in general coupled 
with the Japanese sometimes contemptuous approaches toward Koreans at 
large and South Koreans, in particular, obstruct advancement of neighborly and 
constructive relations.  South Korea’s response to a normal Japan will most likely 
be one of implicit approval with harsh criticism.  South Korean responses hinge 
mainly on how it would affect the North Korean reunification dialogues and the 
security situation.  The Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK or North 
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Korea) shares China’s ideological and realist opposition to increased Japanese 
military activity.  North Korea’s likely opposition to a normal Japan does not stand 
as a very significant factor, however.  In many ways, its opposition would have 
far less impact than challenges coming from China.  Although the DPRK 
presents an open threat to Japan through its missile program, it is quite uncertain 
that it would risk the retaliation of the United States by threatening Japan. 
The two Koreas both share a common history with Japan up until the end 
of the Second World War.  The DPRK is probably Japan's greatest perceived 
threat, and it continues to be the most unpredictable and rogue actor in Northeast 
Asian security matters.  The ROK would experience considerable anxiety over a 
normal Japan given its past uncomfortable position toward Japan’s participation 
in peacekeeping operations.  South Korea is anxious about a more militarily 
active Japan, but there is common ground to work upon to improve the 
relationship: their common ally, the United States.  One possibility is that 
Japanese military involvement in United Nations activities actually might spark 
greater military cooperation between South Korea and Japan if they were 
involved in the same operation in a distant and neutral setting.   
While Japanese relations with the DPRK have been focused more on the 
desire to obtain security guarantees, and Japan’s relations with China have often 
revolved around maintaining a balance of power, relations between Japan and 
South Korea have been more complicated.  Japan and South Korea are both 
allies of the United States and therefore de facto allies of each other.  At the 
same time, both are also increasingly regional economic and political competitors 
and suffer from a strong historical distrust.  This has created a situation where 
Japan and South Korea’s security relationship is increasingly influenced by 
political actions in both Tokyo and Seoul.  South Korea, like China, is concerned 
that the Japanese military deployments overseas are a sign of current efforts in 
the Japanese government to develop an independent security policy.  Unlike 
China, South Korea has no interest in seeing the U.S.–Japan security 
relationship deteriorate.  The major concern that Seoul has regarding Tokyo is 
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operations outside of the U.S.–Japan security framework.  South Korea and 
Japan have made some headway recently to keep this issue from interfering with 
security issues, but an underlying resentment remains. 
North Korea, Japan’s perceived main threat, has developed its nationalism 
over decades through constantly disparaging both Japanese and American 
imperialism.  Pyongyang speculates about being threatened by both nations, and 
will undoubtedly condemn any moves by Japan to strengthen its military and its 
relationship with the United States.  Pyongyang, no doubt, will condemn Japan’s 
constitutional reform provided that it happens in the future, and will treat such 
reforms as evidence of remilitarization of the Japanese society.  South Korea 
shares similar historical animosity towards Japan as other nations in the region, 
and has been outspoken against past Japanese aggression and its apparent 
dismissal of historical wrongdoings.   
Victor Cha acknowledges the importance of history that has passed 
between Japan and Korea and adds that the emotionalism produced because of 
this history continues to plague the relations between the archipelago and the 
peninsula.  He further adds that although history does tinge the interaction 
between Japan and Korea, it is mainly the larger geostrategic concerns—the 
broader realpolitik matters and unease between Korea and Japan and the 
Korean patriotism, which Cha equates to anti-Japanism—that ultimately 
determine political outcomes.221
E. RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 
The basic bilateral relationship between Japan and Russia revolves 
around geography and economics.  Since the mid-1700s, Japan and Russia 
advanced rival claims to the Kurile Islands.  The Japanese and Russian views of 
one another are based on this long history of competitive aims in the North 
Pacific and North Asia.  Russo-Japanese trade relations are centered on Siberia, 
which has the potential to be a major supplier of energy for Japan.  Siberia has 
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reserves of oil, natural gas, timber, coal, and ores that are necessary to Japan, a 
resource importer.222  Analysis of these historical relations on geography and 
trade presents a complex picture, which implies that Russia will most likely 
remain indifferent towards Japanese constitutional reforms and the strengthening 
of Self-Defense Forces. 
During the thirteen years between 1968 and 1981, Japan signed six 
agreements with Russia related to the development of Siberian natural 
resources.223  Even though remains a modest form of trade, Japan and Russia 
have used coastal trade since 1963 to supplement their regular trade and used it 
as a means to maintain a bilateral relationship that benefits both countries.224  
Although economic relations flourished, the political relations were not as friendly 
during the Cold War.  However, recent developments have indicated that 
Russians and Japanese have been assuming more friendly postures.  In 
February 2004, Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Losyukov, 
stated that: 
Active work to advance the interests of Russia in the Asia-Pacific 
region is one of the most important objectives of Russian 
diplomacy.  No one doubts that Russia and Japan belong among 
the leading states of this region, on which the future character of 
the Asian-Pacific community and its formation and subsequent 
development trends largely depend. Hence the need for the close 
cooperation of our countries. The bilateral political dialogue, 
including that at the highest level, is characterized by growing 
intensity and the enhancement of confidentiality.  It is of 
fundamental importance that both sides are underscoring their 
strategic interest in their further rapprochement, both at the political 
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Japan, in my opinion, is the key aspect of our trade-and-economic 
collaboration.  We are disposed to work closely in this field with 
Japan.225
Russia and Japan continue to enhance their cooperation within the 
international antiterrorist coalition.  The two countries have established relations 
between their defense and security agencies, the goal of which is to maintain and 
strengthen the military and political stability in the Northeast Asian region.226
Despite the aforementioned development of positive relations, Russia 
would greet a Japanese adoption of normalcy with mixed feelings and concern.  
Russia continues to see Japan in the light of its role in the American Cold War 
coalition, in addition to its much longer history of competition for influence in 
Northeast Asia.  Similarly, Japan approaches Russia with hesitancy and views it 
as a difficult and hostile neighbor.227  Although relations with newly reorganized 
Russia proved to be better than they had been with the Soviet Union, the 
Japanese, for many years even in the post-Cold War era, found it difficult to 
change their guard stance toward their old foe.  The 1992 Japanese Defense 
White Paper stated this clearly, declaring that although the Cold War had ended, 
the threat of Russia remained.228
Both Japan and Russia share a common concern over Chinese military 
developments.  Even though Russians may pose a threat to Japanese energy 
security, they generally view Japan as a source of balance against a strong 
China.  As a result, they have yet to signal any reaction to a normal Japan except 
vetoing the Japanese application for permanent United Nations Security Council 
 
225 “Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Losyukov's Interview with ITAR-
TASS News Agency on the Questions of Russian-Japanese Relations,” in Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department official website, available at 
http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/31C7E29150FB4F38C3256E390051C54C?OpenDocument, 
accessed on 12 November 2005. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Wolf Mendl, Japan’s Asia Policy: Regional Security & Global Interests, (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), 52. 
228 Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the 
Cold War, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 9. 
  86
                                           
membership.  Russians plan to veto Japanese accession mainly because they 
are inclined to keep the number of members in the Security Council limited to five 
in order to remain more influential in world affairs and receive a larger share of 
the power pie around the globe.  An expected Russian veto does not signal any 
discouragement of Japanese normalization.  
F. SOUTHEAST ASIAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 
Relations between Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) began informally in 1973 and were formalized in 1977.229  The relations 
between ASEAN and Japan have predominantly been economic.  Some of the 
shared security interests between ASEAN and Japan include maritime safety 
against piracy and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which provides for a 
multilateral security dialogue between Japan and the ASEAN countries.230  The 
fact that the security relations between Japan and the countries of ASEAN have 
only recently begun does not rule out the premise that the ASEAN countries 
would oppose Japan assuming a greater military role within the region.  
However, the recent trend with an increasing acceleration of being accepted by 
most of the countries in the region is to view Japan as a “balancer” against 
China.  The historical legacy of Japanese imperialism in Southeast Asia is 
somewhat retreating in the popular mind, as evidenced in a 1998 Southeast 
Asian public opinion poll, where the overwhelming majority of the respondents 
saw Japan as a trustworthy partner that would not become a military threat.231  
Southeast Asia, while having economic connections with Japan and some recent 
initiatives of strategic cooperation, is unwilling to accept Japan's bid for 
normalization unless it provides a strong balance of power against China.  
 
229 “Japan - ASEAN Relations,” in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website, 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/relation/overview.html, accessed on 12 
November 2005. 
230 “Diplomatic Bluebook 2004,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website, 
available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/blubook/2004, 151, accessed on 12 November 2005. 
231 Sandra R. Leavitt, The Lack Of Security Cooperation Between Southeast Asia And 
Japan: Yen Yes, Pax Nippon No, available at 
http://caliber.ucpress.net/doi/pdf/10.1525/as.2005.45.2.216?cookieSet=1, accessed on 12 
November 2005, 229.  This article was published n Asian Survey, Vol. 45, Issue 2, 216–240.  
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Japan's history of aggression and occupation in Southeast Asia serves as 
constant reminder of what a "militarized" Japan is capable of; however, the 
aforementioned 1998 public opinion poll indicated that many of the past 
memories have been taking new shapes as economic development becomes 
more important than historical enmities.  Therefore, the remote possibility that a 
normal Japan would be welcomed by ASEAN exists, but a realistic approach 
indicates that currently, Southeast Asian nations are neither eager nor supportive 
of a normal, militarily strong Japan. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The reaction to Japan’s normalization in summary is American support, 
Chinese and Korean suspicion and opposition, and Russian indifference.  Even 
though Southeast Asian nations remain unsupportive at large, their reaction is 
not as significant as that of Northeast Asian players and the Americans.  On a 
further note, South and Central Asian regions are relevant, but their reactions are 
not as significant either.  However, a well thought-out Japanese foreign policy 
should take into account the reactions from the nuclear powers of South Asia, 
namely India and Pakistan, as well as the resource rich countries of Central Asia.  
In the end, no significant barrier stands against Japanese normalization; 
however, Japan must follow cautious and amicable relations with China in order 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND ASSESSMENTS 
This thesis analyzed Japanese political change in the post-Cold War era.  
In order to be a complete and through analysis, it reviewed the history of Japan, 
assessed Japanese foreign policy in the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras, 
and evaluated the question of a normal Japan and its impacts on Japan’s foreign 
relations with its neighbors.  Two central themes emerged as a result of this 
study.  First, Japan should become a normal country because it would benefit 
Japanese interests by advancing Japan’s regional leadership and increasing its 
global significance, increasing the likelihood of Japan’s accession to the United 
Nations Security Council as a permanent member, which then would increase 
Japanese influence on world affairs; and improving Japan’s economy in both the 
short and the long run.  Second, no significant barrier stands against Japanese 
normalization; however, Japan must follow cautious and amicable relations with 
China in order to achieve its goals, particularly permanent accession to the UN 
Security Council.  These central themes were reached due to the following 
findings and assessments.  
Throughout its history, which is replete with internal rivalry and conflict, 
Japan never posed significant aggression in its foreign policy with expansionist 
and adventurist characteristics—with the exception of an insignificant expedition 
to Korea in the 1590s—before the Meiji Restoration.  Hoping to lift itself up to an 
equal footing with the rest of the great powers in the era of imperialism, Japan 
slipped into a defective path of militarism, which brought its unfortunate downfall 
at the end of the Second World War.  The aggressive 1930s and the warring 
1940s have taught significant lessons to the Japanese, which are so well 
engrained in their culture and so well instilled in their minds that any expectation 
of aggression from them is lame.  A normal, assertive, and objective Japan 
mobilizing its latent economic power to help the stabilizing powers of the world 
would only benefit stability, peace, and world harmony.      
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Japan has been in the center of international relations in the Asia-Pacific 
region since the early 20th century, and it surfaced as the most dynamic 
economic center in Asia after the Second World War.  The Japanese economy 
has global significance and its geopolitical location rests in the heart of American, 
Chinese, and Russian interests, which makes it obvious that Japan is an 
important regional actor.232  Japan’s role in the global context, however, remains 
somewhat mysterious.  The Japanese quietness and inactivity in world political 
affairs after the end of the Second World War has led may scholars to attribute 
this lack of activity to the American protection of Japan.  The Japanese domestic 
politics that emerged after 1952 also played a significant role in Japanese anti-
militarism and pacifism.233
A marked shift in Japan's security role in both regional and international 
affairs has become apparent in the post-Cold War context.  Japan could no 
longer continue its Cold War policies of economic diplomacy coupled with 
security dependence on America.  In the early 1980s when the Soviet-American 
military competition was intensifying, Japan took salient steps to strengthen its 
defense policy and security alliance with the United States.  These steps in 
strengthening the Japanese military were not satisfactory for the 1990-1991 
Persian Gulf Crisis.  Domestic politics and the Article 9 impediment prevented 
Japan from providing the necessary support for the United States.  At this point, 
the Western world started scrutinizing and questioning the Japanese stance 
towards global security affairs.234  Japan, in the post-Cold War environment, is 
still reluctant to partake in international security challenges, but it has readjusted 
its strategy in four ways.  Expansion of its defense cooperation with the United 
States, an assertive role in defending its own territory, the provision of non-
combat support against terrorism, and support of East Asian economic 
integration and cooperation are indicators of this readjustment in Japanese 
 
232 Yahuda, 186-203.  
233 Katzenstein and Okawara, xi.    
234 Singh.  
  91
                                           
foreign policy.  Koizumi’s much-criticized support for the war on terrorism and 
stronger alliance with the United States created greater room for Japan to 
maneuver autonomously in pursuing its foreign policy in Asia and beyond.235      
Three different viewpoints emerged in Japanese political and academic 
circles in the post-Cold War era: Japanese normalization, Japanese 
constitutional reform, and continued pacifism.  Roughly, fifteen years have 
passed since the end of the Cold War, and Japan has yet to make a decisive 
move towards one or the other of the aforementioned approaches.  It has moved 
toward constitutional reform with laws, which permit the deployment of Japanese 
troops to Iraq, but such moves have been very slow and cautious.  Given the 
current climate in Northeast Asia and throughout the world, Japan and the United 
States see an unquestionable need for each other.  Japan is central to the United 
States’ Asian security strategy, even as the threats have shifted and changed 
over time.  The U.S. remains Japan’s primary protector, and would be relied on 
heavily if Japan were to become involved in a war.  So far, the alliance has had 
the good fortune of not being pushed to a breaking point.  If recent developments 
continue, it appears that Washington and Tokyo will further advance their 
cooperation and strengthen the alliance.  In 2004, Secretary Armitage followed 
up on his report by stating that Japan could count on America, and increasingly, 
America could count on Japan.236
It is apparent that with the policies of the reformist Koizumi and his 
cabinet, a new Japan is developing.  Although more nationalistic and more 
secure than before, the basic Japanese strategy has remarkably remained the 
same as before, continuing the post-World War II legacy of anti-militarism.  
Japan pursues a comprehensive strategy of integrating its security and economic 
interests.  The alliance with the United States serves as the foundation of 
Japanese physical security.  Even though there may seem to be little reason for 
 
235 Mochizuki, 103. 
236 Ralph A. Cossa, 104 
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Japan to adopt a military posture less reliant on the United States,237 the 
reformist Koizumi government has been working to implement such changes 
while continuing to strengthen the alliance with the United States.  With the 
encouragement of the United States, the Japanese have concluded that although 
the U.S. alliance is essential, it does not suffice to make Japan more secure and 
prosperous.238
Since his assumption of duties as the Prime Minister in April 2001, 
Koizumi has insisted on expanding the Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ mission.  
The recent publication of an update to the 1996 National Defense Program 
Outline and accompanying Mid-Term Defense Forces Reorganization Plan has 
accelerated the Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ shift in its mission.  A long and 
challenging legal and doctrinal path lays ahead for the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces before Japan can operate as a “normal” country.  However, Japan’s 
increased military participation in world affairs has triggered suspicions among 
regional neighbors.  If Japan becomes a normal country, Japanese relations with 
China, the two Koreas, and the Southeast Asian countries may face degradation 
since these countries have pronounced their view on such transformation as the 
reappearance of Japanese militarism.  Japan’s normalization receives a huge 
amount of American support, and Russia remains apathetic to such political 
change.  South and Central Asian regions are relevant, but their reactions are not 
very significant.  Although Japanese normalization does not face a challenging 
obstacle; Japan must continue to be observant and considerate of China and 
should further enhance its relations with China in addition to the two Koreas.   
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON JAPANESE NORMALIZATION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis suggests Japan should choose to build up its military and 
reform its constitutional system to defend itself from external and internal threats 
and help its allies in security matters around the world.  By doing so, Japan will 
 
237 Mochizuki, 105. 
238 Ibid, 104 
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have many advantages over its current position in world affairs.  It will reinforce 
its ties with the developed countries of the West and other less developed and 
developing countries around the world.  It will also have positive economic and 
political impacts on Japan.  While doing so, it is important for Japan to learn from 
the West.  It is at least equally important, however, for Japan to act as itself and 
evaluate itself with its own capabilities and in accordance with its own geopolitical 
and geostrategic importance.  Japan can only afford to continue its alliance with 
the United States, and it would benefit from normal statehood in security-related 
and economic interests along with establishing a firm regional leadership with an 
increasing global significance.  There are a few specific prerequisites that will 
indicate Japan is becoming a normal country.  In this context, revision of Article 9 
authorizing collective defense, re-designation of the Japanese Defense Agency 
as the Japanese Ministry of Defense, significant economic and political reform 
with consensus among the parties for collective defense, increased defense 
procurement above the current one percent ceiling, relaxing of arms export 
laws,239 and a permanent Japanese membership on the UN Security Council are 
some examples or signs of Japanese normalcy.   
On another note, amidst continuing debate on Japanese constitutional 
revision and thus normalization, Japan’s foreign policy still remains dependent on 
its alliance with the United States.  Should Japan choose not to enhance its 
current level of assertiveness in its foreign affairs, its chance of becoming a 
permanent member in the United Nations Security Council will remain limited at 
best.  Thus, an apparent recommendation for Japan from this thesis that will 
benefit not only Japan but also the United States and the rest of the world 
 
239 The “Three Principles on Arms Exports (TPAE)” established in 1967 prevents the 
Japanese military industrial complex to grow further.  Japanese companies do not allow their 
defense products to be exported because of the TPAE.  Basically, the TPAE prevents Japan from 
exporting armaments, and from sharing defense technology with any nation other than the United 
States.  From the point of view of private companies, it might be natural for them to look at 
overseas markets to make profits as they have done for commercial products. However, because 
of these policies, the market for their products is limited to the JDA.  For more information on 
Japan’s arms exports, see “Japan's Policies on the Control of Arms Exports, “in Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/, accessed on 12 November 2005. 
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including the Northeast Asian region is to continue to strengthen the U.S.-Japan 
Security Alliance.  The effects of 9/11 and the uncertainty of North Korea and 
China will behoove Japan to further advance its strong security alliance with the 
United States in order to be able to adjust to meet the needs of both nations. 
As Japan further expands the mission and increases the capability of its 
Self-Defense Forces, it must be prepared to deal with issues of how North Korea 
will perceive these moves.  Japan must also be prepared to expand this 
perception management to issues that North Korea sees as efforts to revive 
Japanese militarism.  In order for relations to truly progress, Japan must develop 
a plan that addresses concerns that both the South Korean government and 
nationalist elements within the Japanese government have over the treatment of 
historical issues.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Japan needs American assistance against a direct threat from North 
Korea, yet it appears that Japanese relations with China and Russia are 
disadvantaged by historical enmities as well as its cooperation with the United 
States.  The state of the United States’ relations with China and Russia will 
continue to affect Japan as long as it remains tied to the United States on 
defense issues.  Therefore, this limits Japan’s ability to negotiate independently 
with China and Russia.  Despite this fact, Japan has already begun developing 
independent military cooperation with Russia and South Korea.  It may also 
become a catalyst that drives Japan to revise its constitution.  The United States 
therefore needs to be sensitive to the dilemma Tokyo faces as it seeks to engage 
its neighbors.  In this context, a few important issues must be taken into account 
by the American foreign policymakers. 
The United States should not involve itself in the Japanese domestic 
debate over its constitution and Article 9.  However, it should support Japan at 
the highest level in whatever policy option it chooses while encouraging Japan to 
become normal.  Even though some may claim that Washington must come to 
grips with the fact that the days of the brotherly relationship with Japan are 
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rapidly fading, it is more accurate and precise to state that the former U.S.-Japan 
alliance is transforming into another form without losing its core values.  Claiming 
that the characteristics of the U.S.-Japan security alliance are vanishing would be 
unconvincing and incomplete as long as the United States continues to be the 
superpower and the alliance is in place.  Although it could be said that Japan has 
every right to stand on its own as a legitimate political, economic, and military 
power and assume a major role in maintaining the peace and security in the Asia 
Pacific region, it would be incorrect to say that Japan should do this at the 
expense of the United States—an irrational move no country around the world 
should make.  However, it would be wise for the United States to follow policies 
that support Japanese normalization without either upsetting the balance in Asia 
or upsetting the domestic tranquility in Japan by placing too much pressure on 
Japan to change.   
It is in the U.S. national interests to have Japan as a strong political, 
economic, and military ally capable of operating in a collective security role with 
the United States.  This will also allow Japan to assume a greater military role in 
assisting with the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.  Additionally, 
Japan still needs the shelter of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for an effective 
deterrence policy to function.  Before Japan revises its constitution, Washington 
should help Tokyo develop and implement a campaign to convince the other 
Asian countries why it is in the interest of the region for Japan to make such a 
revision.  This should be conducted in a way similar to what was done when 
Japan adopted the new defense guidelines.  At that time, both American and 
Japanese officials briefed Beijing on the guidelines before signing the 
agreement.240  In this case, however, should Japan revise its constitution, similar 
actions need to extend to the rest of the nations in Asia.  It is significantly in the 
U.S. national interest to encourage the revision of Japan’s constitution and its  
 
 
240 Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 428-
429. 
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normalization, and the United States should work with Japan to provide its 
neighbors an outline of Tokyo’s intentions and strategic objectives with regard to 
its normalcy.   
A normal Japan will ensure the United States will receive the required 
support outlined in the new Defense Guidelines.  It will also ensure a Japanese 
role in maintaining peace and security in the region.  This would provide the 
United States with more capability to handle its other commitments around the 
world.  Moreover, it will lead to realistic training conducted by the American and 
Japanese forces, which in turn will ensure their ability to operate together and 
support one another in combat should the need arise.  It is also important for 
Washington to treat Tokyo as an equal partner.  Such treatment will also act as a 
check/balance factor for Japan’s neighbors in the region because it will indicate 
that the United States is not completely removing the lid off of Japan while it will 
demonstrate that the United States is pursuing a cooperative foreign policy to 
ensure peace and stability in the region. 
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